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POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IN MISSOURIFIVE YEARS UNDER AMENDED RULE 27.26
GAxty L. ANDER5ON*
I. INTRODUCTION

On January 9, 1967, this court adopted a revised S. Ct. Rule 27.26.
The effective date of the revised rule is September 1, 1967.... The
amended rule was adopted after considerable study and is intended
to provide a post-conviction procedure in accord with the principles enunciated in the so-called trilogy of Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, ... Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, ... and Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293.... Further in keeping with the teachings
of the trilogy, the amended rule is designed to discover and adjudicate all claims for relief in -one application and avoid successive
motions by requiring motions to be in questionnaire form and by
providing for the appointment of counsel if the motion presents
questions of law or issues of fact and the movant is shown to be
indigent....'
Thus did the Supreme Court of Missouri introduce a new era of post-conviction relief under a "radically amended ' 2 rule 27.26.3 Even before it went
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia (on leave,
1972-73, as Executive Secretary, Missouri Committee to Draft a Modem Criminal
Code), foimerly Prosecuting Attorney of Union County, Iowa; B.S., Iowa State
University, 1960; J.D., University of Iowa, 1962; LL.M., Harvard University, 1968.

1. State v. Stidham, 415 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
2. State v. Maxwell, 411 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Mo. 1967).
3. Prior to September 1, 1967, Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.26 consisted
of a single paragraph:
A prisoner in custody under sentence and claiming a right to be released
on the ground that such sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution and laws of this State or the United States, or that the court imposing such sentence was without jurisdiction to do so, or that such sentence
was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law or is otherwise
subject to collateral attack, may file a motion at any time in the court
which imposed such sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the same. Unless
the motion and the files and records of the case show to the satisfaction of
the court that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause
notice thereof to be served on the prosecuting attorney, grant a prompt
hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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into effect, the amended rule was described in Garton v. Swenson 4 as "the
most enlightened postconviction procedure of any state,"5 and the Supreme
Court of Missouri was given "the highest commendation for again demonstrating its traditional position of leadership in the field of judicial admin-

istration."6

Because the amended rule was designed to discover and adjudicate all
claims for relief in one application in order to avoid successive post-conviction motions, the supreme court may not have anticipated a very substantial increase in its appellate caseload as a result of amending the rule.7
In 1966, the year before the amended rule went into effect, the supreme
court handed down 26 opinions in rule 27.26 appeals. In five years after
September 1, 1967, however, counting all decisions prior to January 1, 1973,
the supreme court handed down a staggering total of 325 opinions in
rule 27.26 appeals,8 an average of about 60 opinions per year. The opinion
clusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment
was rendered without jurisdiction or that the sentence imposed was illegal
or otherwise subject to collateral attack, or that there was such a denial or
infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the
judgment subject to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set aside
the judgment and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant
a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate. The court
need not entertain a second motion or successive motions for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner. An order sustaining or overruling a
motion filed under the provisions of this Rule shall be deemed a final
judgment within the purview of Rules 28.08 and 28.04.
Mo. Sup. CT, R. 27.26, RSMo 1959.

4. 266 F. Supp. 726 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
5. Id. at 728.
6. Id.
7. The court may have anticipated a substantial decrease in the filing of
"nuisance" applications for post-conviction relief. The author served as co-counsel
for an indigent 27.26 movant who filed 16 pro se petitions and motions in the
supreme court alone before he finally received an evidentiary hearing and took an
appeal under amended rule 27.26. Starting soon after his murder conviction in
1949, he also filed II petitions and motions in the trial court seeking post-conviction
relief, and 6 petitions for habeas corpus in the federal courts. Until 1968, when the
supreme court applied the principles of amended rule 27.26, most of his petitions
and motions were denied without a hearing for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted or because the matters that he sought to raise had previously
been ruled upon without a hearing. One plenary 27.26 evidentiary hearing soon
after conviction, with adequate counsel, might have resulted in finality in the
conviction at least 20 years before it was finally achieved and the saving of untold
days of judicial time wasted in considering pro se applications for relief. Mahurin
v. State, 477 S.W.2d 3 (Mo. En Banc 1972).
8. The caseload, broken down into years following September 1, 1967, was as
follows:
1967-1968 ......................................
14 opinions
1968-1969 ...................................... 59 opinions
1969-1970 ......................................
57 opinions
19701971 ...................................... 76 opinions
1971-1972 ....................................... 82 opinions
Sept. 1, 1972 to end of 1972 ...................... 87 opinions
825 opinions
The 73 opinions that the supreme court handed down in 1972 were all in appeals
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/6
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rate rose to 82 per year in the last 4 months of 1971 and the first 8 months
of 1972. Fortunately, under the judicial amendment to the constitution
effective January 1, 1972, 9 most of the rule 27.26 appeals are now being
distributed among the geographical divisions of the court of appeals.1 0
Although the supreme court has been very busy in the past 5 years
writing rule 27.26 opinions, it has granted little relief. In 37 of the 325
appeals, it granted some type of relief. The "relief" in 20 of the appeals
was limited to a remand for further proceedings, usually an evidentiary
hearing." In 17 appeals the supreme court ruled that the case required
major relief. The state obtained major relief in 4 appeals;' 2 therefore,
27.26 movants obtained major relief in only 13 cases.
In no case did the supreme court hold that the movant was entitled
to be released from custody after the judgment was vacated and set aside.
In 2 cases it vacated the conviction and ordered a new trial. 13 In 8 cases
involving attacks on pleas of guilty, it permitted the movants to withdraw their pleas. 14 In the 3 other cases in which the supreme court
pending prior to January 1, 1972, the effective date of the judicial amendment
to article V of the Missouri Constitution, which was amended at a special election
held August 4, 1970. Mo. CoNsr. art. V, § 31 (4). A substantial backlog of such
appeals still exists. The Clerk of the Missouri Supreme Court reported that on
January 1, 1973, 111 rule 27.26 appeals with transcripts were still pending. Thus,
another year or two will pass before the court decides all the backlog cases. Telephone conversation with Thomas F. Simon, Clerk of the Missouri Supreme Court,
Feb. 16, 1978.
9. Mo. CONsT. art. V, § 31 (4).
10. The leading case on the present jurisdiction of the supreme court in
27.26 cases and criminal appeals is Garrett v. State, 481 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. En Banc
1972). Unless a 27.26 case invloves "the construction of the Constitution of the
United States or of this state," or a crime "punishable by a sentence of death or
life imprisonment," the court of appeals has jurisdiction. Mo. CONsT. art. V, § 3.
Apparently, constitutional issues governed by "well-established principles" do not
involve the construction of the constitution, and the phrase "punishable by
. . . death or life imprisonment" embraces "only those offenses having as alternative punishments life imprisonment or death." Garrett v. State, 481 S.W.2d
225, 226-27 (Mo. En Banc 1972). In light of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), the supreme court could find that it has no exclusive jurisdiction in
"capital" cases, because there are none under current Missouri law.
11. E.g., Noble v. State, 477 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. 1972); Warren v. State, 473
S.W.2d 427 (Mo. 1971); Thomas v. State, 465 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1971); State v.
Rose, 440 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1969); State v. Brown, 436 S.W.2d 724 (Mo. 1969);
State v. Gerberding, 433 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1968); State v. Sayre, 420 S.W.2d 303
(Mo. 1967).
12. Winford v. State, 485 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. En Banc 1972); Hulett v. State,
468 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1971) (trial court without authority to amend sentence);
State v. Frey, 441 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1969) (erroneous discharge of movant entitled
to appeal conviction); State v. Todd, 433 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. 1968) (attack on action
of Department of Corrections rather than judgment).
13. Bullington v. State, 459 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1970); Montgomery v. State,
454 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1970). Both cases involved allegations of lack of jurisdiction.
In the Montgomery case the court had no jurisdiction because there was no information on file. In Bullington the indictment was insufficient to charge the
crime established.
14. Morris v. State, 482 S.W.2d 459 (Mo. 1972); State v. Reese, 481 S.W.2d
497 (Mo. En Banc 1972); Williams v. State 473 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1971); Doepke v.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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granted major relief, the movants obtained something less than a new trial
or an opportunity to plead not guilty and to stand trial. 15
Considering how infrequently the supreme court grants relief after
Missouri trial courts have denied 27.26 motions, it may seem surprising
that so many prisoners continue to appeal. Perhaps the primary reason for
appeal is the hope of obtaining federal habeas corpus relief after the prisoner has exhausted his Missouri post-conviction remedies, which include a
27.26 appeal. 16 Here again, however, the chance of obtaining substantial
relief is slight. The federal courts wrote opinions in 44 of the 312 cases in
which the supreme court granted no major 27.26 relief. Many more federal
petitions for habeas corpus are denied without published opinions, so
that a much higher proportion of the 312 cases probably reached the federal courts. Federal courts granted habeas corpus relief in only 8 of the 44
cases in which opinions were published. In 4 of these cases the ultimate
"relief" may have been an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a new
trial 17 or resentencing s would be necessary. However, the granting of
federal habeas corpus probably resulted in new trials in 2 cases19 and in an
opportunity to plead not guilty and to stand trial in 2 others. 20

State, 465 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1971); Burrell v. State, 461 S.W.2d 738 (Mo. 1971);
State v. Reese, 457 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. 1970); Morris v. State, 456 S.W.2d 289 (Mo.

1970); State v. Arnold, 419 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1967). A movant seeking to withdraw
his plea should file a combined motion under rules 27.25 and 27.26 to set aside the
sentence and judgment and to withdraw his plea of guilty.
15. In Ball v. State, 479 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. 1972), the supreme court set aside
the judgment and sentence so that the movant could file a motion for a new trial
with the assistance of counsel. In State v. Dixon, 434 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1968),
the supreme court set aside the judgment and sentence and ordered the trial court
to consider further evidence on the applicability of the habitual criminal statute.
The trial court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence until it determined
this issue, because the defendant was entitled to jury sentencing and a new trial if he
had not previously been convicted and sentenced. In State v. Garner, 432 S.W.2d
259 (Mo. 1968), the supreme court set aside the sentence and judgment because
of a defective information even though the movant's sentence had been commuted
and served before it decided the appeal.
16. Four of the 27.26 movants who later petitioned for federal habeas corpus had their petitions dismissed for failure to exhaust available state remedies.
Larson v. Swenson, 425 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1970); Williams v. State, 317 F. Supp.
338 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (had not appealed to highest state court); Holland v. Swen.
son, 305 F. Supp. 1093 (W.D. Mo. 1969); Fritz v. Swenson, 287 F. Supp. 707 (W.D.
Mo. 1968). Most "exhaustion" dismissals do not result in published opinions.
17. Renfro v. Swenson, 315 F. Supp. 733 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Gray v. Swenson,
302 F. Supp. 1162 (W.D. Mo. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 9 (8th Cir. 1970); White v.
Swenson, 301 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
18. Garrett v. Swenson, 459 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1972).
19. Spidle v. Swenson, 313 F. Supp. 203 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (double jeopar'dy);

Brizendine v. Swenson, 302 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (failure to conduct

hearing on competency, counsel ineffective).
20. Pedicord v. Swenson, 431 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1970) (involuntary plea of

guilty); Turley v. Swenson, 314 F. Supp. 1304 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (involuntary plea,

no waiver of right to effective counsel).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/6
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II.

STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-COI~qCTION REMEDIES

Since 1967, the year the Missouri Supreme Court amended rule 27.26,
the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal
Justice has prepared an excellent set of Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies 21 that merit consideration. Although amended rule 27.26
was clearly an "enlightened postconviction procedure" 22 in 1967, in many
respects it fails to conform to the ABA Standards Relating to Post-Convic23
tion Remedies.
Section 2.1 of the ABA Standards, 24 entitled "Grounds for Relief," is
relevant to the following review of decisions under amended rule 27.26.
Although rule 27.26 defines broadly the Missouri grounds for post-conviction relief, the supreme court has not literally followed the language of the
rule in all cases; the scope of relief available is narrower than that recom-

21. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDES (Approved
Draft, 1968). The ABA House of Delegates approved these standards in February, 1968.
22. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
23. R. POPPER & J. SCURLOCK, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE WITH MISSOURI LAW, RULES AND LEGAL

PRACTICE 99-114 (1971). The authors compare 14 different sets of ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice with Missouri law and practice.
24. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO POsT-CoNVICTION REMEDIES § 2.1 (Approved
Draft, 1968) recommends:
A post-conviction remedy ought to be sufficiently broad to provide
relief
(a) for meritorious claims challenging judgments of conviction, induding claims:
(i) that the conviction was obtained or sentence imposed in
violation of the Constitution of the United States or the constitution
or laws of the state in which the judgment was rendered;
(ii) that the applicant was convicted under a statute that is in
violation of the Constitution of the United Sates or the constitution
of the state in which judgment was rendered, or that the conduct for
which the applicant was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(iii) that the court rendering judgment was without jurisdiction
over the person of the applicant or the subject matter;
(iv) that the sentence imposed exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or is othenvise not in accordance with the sentence
authorized by law;
(v) that there exists evidence of material facts, not theretofore
presented and heard, which require vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;
(vi) that there has been a significant change in law, whether
substantive or procedural, applied in the process leading to applicant's conviction or sentence, where sufficient reasons exist to allow
retroactive application of the changed legal standard;
(vii) on grounds otherwise properly the basis for collateral attack upon a criminal judgment:
(b) for meritorious claims challenging the legality of custody or restraint based upon a judgment of conviction, including claims that a
sentence has been fully served or that there has been unlawful revocation
of parole or probation or conditional release.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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mended by section 2.1 of the ABA Standards. 25 Thus any practitioner or
law student 20 preparing a 27.26 motion, or assisting a prisoner to amend
his motion, 2 7 must be familiar with the grounds for relief that the Missouri
case law permits. In addition, he should understand how difficult it usually
is to prove that a basis for relief exists.
III.

PROBLEM AREAS UNDER AMENDED RuLE

27.26

A. Attacks on Guilty Pleas
The most frequent complaint in 27.26 motions has been that the plea
of guilty was involuntary. Prisoners made this complaint, based on a wide
variety of circumstances surrounding guilty pleas, in 143 of the 325 appeals
that the supreme court decided in the past 5 years. However, the supreme
court granted major relief, in the form of leave to withdraw the guilty plea,
28
in only 7 of the 143 appeals.

25. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 27.26 provides, in language identical to former rule 27.26
(note 3 supra):
A prisoner in custody under sentence and claiming a right to be released
on the ground that such sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution and laws of this State or the United States, or that the court
imposing such sentence was without jurisdiction to do so, or that such
sentence was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may file a motion at any time in the

court which imposed such sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the same.
,.. (emphasis added).
The supreme court could interpret the emphasized language to cover most grounds
delineated in ABA

STANDARDS,

supra note 24, § 2.1. R. POPPER &

J.

SCURLOCY,

supra note 23, at 100. In view of the cases limiting the scope of rule 27.26, however, the supreme court should consider including more specific descriptions of
certain categories of relief if it amends the rule again. A suggested formulation,
containing 1 categories, is found in 2 HARV. J. LEows. 189-90 (1965). This would
not only aid movants and practitioners preparing 27.26 motions, but it would also
help to minimize the number of appeals involving questions of the scope of the
remedy.

26. The University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law sends students to the
state penitentiary in Jefferson City to work in a legal aid clinic sponsored by the
Missouri Department of Corrections. Under the direction of a supervising attorney,
law students spend much of their time assisting indigent inmates in preparing
motions for post-conviction relief under rule 27.26. The law school provides training in the civil and criminal law areas relevant to problems of prisoners. The pro.
gram is funded by a grant from the Missouri Law Enforcement Assistance Council.
27. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 27.26 (h) provides:
If a motion presents questions of law or issues of fact, the court shall
appoint counsel immediately to assist the prisoner if he is an indigent
person. Counsel shall be given a reasonable time to confer with the
prisoner and to amend the motion filed hereunder if desired. Counsel

shall have the duty to ascertain from the prisoner whether he has included
all grounds known to the prisoner as a basis for attacking the judgment
and sentence and to amend the motion to include any claims not already
included....
28. Cases cited note 14 supra, except Morris v. State, 456 S.W.2d 289 (Mo,
1970), where the ground for relief was denial of counsel at the time of the guilty
plea.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/6
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"Involuntary plea" complaints are of several common types. The most
common allegation is that the movant's attorney, or sometimes the prosecuting attorney, misled him into believing that he would receive a lenient
sentence. 20 The common practice of plea bargaining with the prosecuting
attorney often results in what the defendant interprets, or claims to interpret, as a promise of leniency.30 If the sentence is longer than the defendant expected, he often thinks that the court should grant a motion to
withdraw the plea because he did not receive the "consideration" for his
plea.
Another frequent complaint, which sometimes accompanies an allegation that movant was misled, is the "coerced plea" complaint. Many types
of coercion have allegedly caused involuntary pleas. Some defendants have
pleaded guilty because they feared, or had received threats of, imposition
of the death penalty as the result of standing trial. 31 Others have argued

that they pleaded guilty because of fear that the prosecution would use
illegally obtained evidence to convict them at trial.3 2 Allegedly inhumane
jail conditions have caused some defendants to plead guilty so that they
could move to a new environment. 33 Often a movant alleges a combination
of coercive factors, perhaps realizing that courts seldom grant relief except

in extreme cases. 34

Many obstacles will probably block the desired relief. In most cases,
especially those involving pleas of guilty entered within the past few years,
29. E.g., Pugh v. State, 485 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1972) (alleged promise of 2
years); Billington v. State, 478 S.W.2d 395 (Mo. 1972) (alleged promise of 10
years); Barylski v. State, 473 S.W.2d 399 (Mo. 1971) (alleged promise of probation
or parole); Doepke v. State, 465 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1971) (defendant misled, relief
granted); Roe v. State, 459 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1970) (alleged promise of parole for
violent crimes); State v. Rose, 440 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1969) (remanded for finding);
State v. Edmondson, 438 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. 1969) (defendant misled, lower court
relief affirmed).
30. If the '27.26 motion states a factual basis for an evidentiary hearing, this
type of complaint should be heard as soon as possible after sentencing. Some prisoners wait until key state witnesses die before complaining that improper inducement secured a plea. E.g., Donaldson v. State, 477 S.W.2d 84 (Mo. 1972), where
the defendant waited 22 years to protest that his deceased attorney had promise4
him a sentence of 15 years if he pleaded guilty.
* 31. E.g., Skaggs v. State, 476 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. 1972); McClure v. State, 470
S.W.2d'548 (Mo. 1971); Richardson v. State, 470 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. 1971); State v.
Harris, 467 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1971); State v. Townsend, 462 S.W.2d 754 (Mo.
1971); Collins v. State, 450 S.W.2d 186 (Mo. 1970); Fleck v. State, 443 S.W.2d 100
(Mo. 1969): Crosswhite v. State, 426 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1968).
32. E.g., Lee v. State, 460 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1970) (coerced confession); Jefferson v. State, 442 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1969); see.Rew v. State, 472 S.W.2d 611 (Mo.
1971) (illegal arrest, search, confession).
33. E.g., Coleman v. State, 473 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. 1971) ("basement" of penitentiary); Collins v. State, 450 S.W.2d 186 (Mo. 1970) (16 months inhumane con.
finement); Dickson v. State, 449 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. 1970) (inhumane conditions of
city jail).
34. E.g., Brodkowicz v. State, 474 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1971) (physical torture,
threats, prolonged solitary confinement); Peck v. State, 467 S.W.2d 884 (Mo. 1971)
(threat to life by deceased sheriff, beating); Collins v. State, 450 S.W.2d 186 (Mo.
1970) (fear of death, coerced confession, improper lineup, inhumane confinement).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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a record is made of the plea proceedings. 3 5 For the purpose of making a
good record and to provide a basis for finding that a plea is voluntary, the
trial judge usually asks the defendant whether he was threatened or induced
in some way to plead guilty. Even if plea bargaining occurred, with a prosecutor making some promise to the defendant in exchange for his plea, the
response is usually in the negative. 3 6 If it becomes apparent that the plea
is the result of proper plea bargaining, the judge will continue by asking
the defendant whether he understands that the court is not bound by any
recommendations of leniency or impressions that the defendant or his
lawyer may have had about the sentence, and that it is solely within the
realm of the court to assess punishment. If the court receives an affirmative
answer, it will, after determining that the defendant understands the nature
of the charge and the possible punishment, accept the plea as being made
"voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge." 37 The utate
may then use the record of the plea proceeding at any subsequent hearing
under Missouri Supreme Court Rules 27.25 and 27.2638 to show that the
plea was voluntary, because it indicates that no threats or promises were
made that might have coerced or misled the defendant into pleading guilty.
As most 27.26 movants have discovered, to "directly contradict the verity
of records of the court"3 9 in a later evidentiary hearing is usually quite
difficult.
Even if the state has no evidence of record to establish that the plea
was voluntary, the 27.26 movant normally must rely on his own testimony
to prove his allegations. Persons who allegedly "coerced" the defendant or
$5. After Boykin v. Alabama, 895 U.S. 238 (1969), a court can expect automatic
reversal if the record is inadequate to show that the defendant intelligently and
knowingly pleaded guilty.
36. The following statement accurately describes the position of the defendant
if the court does not expose plea bargaining in open court:
If the judge, the prosecution, or the defense counsel makes a statement
in open court that is contrary to what he has been led to believe, especially as to promises by the prosecutor or his defense counsel, . . ,
[the defendant] would no more challenge that statement in open court
than he would challenge a clergyman's sermon from the pulpit.
A. TREBACH, THE RATIONING OF JUSTICE 159-60 (1964). The ABA standards contertplate full disclosure of plea agreements to the court. ABA STANPARDS Rm4ATING

TO

OF GUILTY § 3.3 (c) (Approved Draft, 1968). Such disclosure will help insulate
the plea from collateral attack.
37. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 25.04.
38. Any application after sentence to withdraw a plea of guilty is an attack
on the validity of the sentence; the court will treat it as a proceeding to vacate
under rule 27.26. State v. Mountjoy, 420 S.W.2d 316, 328 (Mo. 1967). Therefore,
a defendant who applies to the court under rule 27.25 to set aside the sentence
and judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea should
submit the application to the court on a form substantially like the form appended
to rule 27.26.
39. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 27.26 (e) provides:
This hearing shall be an evidentiary hearing if issues of fact are raised
in the motion, and if the allegations thereof directly contradict the verity
of records of the court, that issue shall be determined in the evidentiary
hearing....
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/6
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"promised" him something usually deny such complaints. However, even
in cases where the state has no evidence to rebut movant's testimony, the
court frequently does not believe his self-serving complaints of coercion or
promises. 40 In short, an allegedly "coerced" or "misled" movant faces substantial difficulty in any attempt to prove that the court should permit him
to withdraw his plea after sentencing "to correct manifest injustice." 4'
Many prisoners have attacked pleas of guilty as being "technically
involuntary" in that the court failed to determine that the plea was "made
voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge," 42 as rule 25.04
requires. While a poor plea record will help a movant who has other evidence that his plea was involuntary, it will not by itself insure a finding of
involuntariness. If after a 27.26 hearing a court finds voluntariness based
on evidence outside the plea record, the supreme court will sustain the finding unless it is dearly erroneous.4 3 The supreme court has reversed lower
court findings of voluntariness in a few extreme cases involving poor plea
records.44
40. The trial court is the judge of credibility; the supreme court defers to
fact findings of the trial judge unless a dear abuse of discretion appears. Watson
v. State, 475 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1972). This is another way of saying that the supreme
court will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact unless they are "dearly
erroneous." Mo. Sup. CT. R. 27.26 (j).
41. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 27.25 provides:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made only before sentence
is imposed or when imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct
manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of
conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea (emphasis
added).
On appeal, the supreme court has limited its review under rule 27.26 (j) to "a determination of whether the findings, conclusions and judgment of the trial court
are clearly erroneous." However, in a guilty plea case under rule 27.25 the court
also determines whether the trial court abused its discretion in deciding that it
was not necessary to "set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea' in order to correct "manifest injustice." E.g., Skaggs v.
State, 476 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. 1972); Fleck v. State, 443 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. 1969);
State v. Mountjoy, 420 S.W.2d 816 (Mo. 1967).
42. E.g., Tyler v. State, 485 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. 1972); McGinnis v. State, 465
S,W.24 540 (Mo. 1971); Peterson v. State, 444 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1969); Drew v.
State, 436 S.W.2d 727 (Mo. 1969); State v. Mountjoy, 420 S.W.2d 316 (Mo. 1967)
(leading case).
43. In Winford v. State, 485 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. En Banc 1972), the lower court
cited failure to comply with rule 25.04 as the sole reason for permitting the movant
to withdraw his plea. On appeal by the state, the supreme court reversed, holding
the conclusion that failure to comply with rule 25.04 required relief to be clearly
erroneous. A majority of the court thought that the plea was dearly voluntary
under the facts found by the lower court, despite the failure to comply with rule
25.04.
In most cases the movant appeals from a specific finding of voluntariness. In
such cases the supreme court holds that the failure of the trial court to comply
with rule 25.04 is immaterial if the evidence at the 27.26 hearing provides support
for the finding that the defendant pleaded guilty voluntarily with understanding
of the nature of the charge. See, e.g., Flood v. State, 476 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1972);
State v. Mountjoy, 420 S.W.2d 316 (Mo. 1967) (leading case).
44. State v. Reese, 481 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. En Banc 1972); Williams v. State, 473
S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1971) (defendant would not talk); State v. Reese, 457 $.W.2d 713
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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The frequent post-conviction argument that a plea was "technically
involuntary" because not sustained by the plea record may have led to the
1969 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama.45
Boykin never claimed that he pleaded guilty under coercion or in ignorance of the consequences 4 6 but the record was silent on whether he
had waived several federal constitutional rights by pleading guiltyY4 The
court held that a conviction cannot stand without an affirmative showing
of record that the defendant pleaded guilty voluntarily and understandingly.48 A minority of the Court 49 and some commentators 50 have read
Boykin expansively as indicating that due process may require state trial
courts to follow the basic procedural requirements of rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure when accepting guilty pleas.5 ' Later cases
indicate, however, that upon collateral attack a court is not bound to grant
relief simply because the record made at the time of the guilty plea is de-

(Mo. En Banc 1970) (related to State v. Reese, 481 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. En Banc 1972))
(partial relief); State v. Arnold, 419 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1967).
45. 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (Douglas, J.).
46. In his dissent, Justice Harlan emphasized the failure of defendant to
allege "that his guilty plea was involuntary or made without knowledge of the
consequences." Id. at 245. He would always require a defendant to make "suffidently credible allegations that his state guilty plea was involuntary" in order to
be "ertitled to a hearing as to the truth of those allegations." Id. at 246.
47. Id. at 243. Justice Douglas listed these constitutional rights waived by a
plea of guilty:
First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the
Fourteenth ....
Second, is the right to trial by jury.... Third, is the right
We cannot presume a waiver of these three
to tonfront one's accusers ....

important federal rights from a silent record. Id.
A plea of guilty waives many other constitutional rights that Justice Douglas did
not list; e.g:, the right to compulsory process for obtaining defense witnesses, the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and to have illegally seized
evidence excluded from trial. Carried to its logical extreme, Boykin would require
affirmative evidence that the defendant had been informed of each right waived
by a guiltj' plea before the court could accept the plea. No court has ever gone
that far.
48. 395 U.S. at 244.
49. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Black, concluded:
So far as one can make out from the Court's opinion, what is now in ef.
fect being held is that the prophylactic procedures of Criminal Rule 11
are substantially applicable to the States as a matter of federal constitutional due process....
Id. at 247.
50. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 184-85
(1969).
51. FED. R. CpuM. P. 11 contains language that goes beyond the related provisions of Mo. Sup. C. R. 25.04:
The court ...

shall not accept such plea without first addressing the de.

fendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily
with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences pf
the plea.
1FD. R. Cium. P. 11 (italics indicate additional requirements).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/6
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ficient in one or more respects.5 2 If other available evidence, such as counsel's prior explanation of constitutional rights, shows that the defendant
entered the plea voluntarily and understandingly, an "affirmative showing
of record" has been made that will probably satisfy a majority of the Supreme Court.5 3 The Missouri courts are unlikely to go beyond the federal
cases to hold that rule 25.04 requires a "perfect record" at the time a plea
54
of guilty is accepted.
Although the Missouri courts are not reading Boykin expansively as
requiring state courts to follow the procedural requirements of federal
rule 11, they are beginning to read it expansively in another respect. Dictum
in the majority opinion in Boykin suggests that a court may be able to insulate a plea of guilty from federal collateral attack by leaving "a record
adequate for any review that may be later sought," 55 and thereby forestalling "the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky

memories." 5 6 Under a broad reading of this dictum, courts could avoid
post-conviction evidentiary hearings by holding that the record of the plea
proceeding is conclusive on the issue of whether the plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly.57

52. See, e.g., United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1971) (court
did not inform defendant of right to confront accusers and of privileges against
compulsory self-incrimination).
53. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (guilty plea acceptable
although motivated by fear of death penalty), where the Court noted:
At the state court hearing on post-conviction relief, the testimony confirmed that Alford had been fully informed by his attorney as to his
rights on a plea of not guilty and as to the consequences of a plea of
guilty. Since the record in this case affirmatively indicates that Alford was
aware of the consequences of his plea of guilty and of the rights waived
by the plea, no issue of substance under Boykin ...
even if that case was held applicable ....

would be presented

Id. at 29 n. 3 (emphasis added).
54. Recent cases continue to rely on the leading case of State v. Mountjoy,
420 S.W.2d 316 (Mo. 1967). Tyler v. State, 485 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. 1972); see note 43
supra.
55. 395 U.S. at 244.
56. Id. This language is also susceptible to a narrow reading; so read, it would
indicate that the Court is urging that the creation of better evidence is a means to
discourage and decide collateral attacks. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.
459 (1969) (related case), where the Court said with regard to strict application
of federal rule 11 to federal defendants pleading guilty:
Second, the Rule is intended to produce a complete record at the time
the plea is entered of the factors relevant to this voluntariness determination. Thus, the more meticulously the Rule is adhered to, the more it
tends to discourage, or at least to enable more expeditious disposition of,
the numerous and often frivolous post-conviction attacks on the constitutional validity of guilty pleas.
Id. at 465.
57, But see Jones v. United States, 384 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1967) (federal
prisoner), rejecting this approach and holding that the plea record is "evidential
on the issue of voluntariness ... not conclusive." Id. at 917. The court said:

It isnot the logical converse of [Boykin] ... that compliance with Rule 11
bars a subsequent ... petition containing allegations as to factual matPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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In applying such a broad reading of the Boykin dictum, the main prob.
lem is determining when a plea record "conclusively show[s] that the prisoner is entitled to no relief."58 A recent Missouri decision, Colbert v. State,69
is a leading case on that problem. Colbert indicates that the supreme court
would like to reduce substantially the number of 27.26 motions attacking
Missouri guilty pleas and the number of evidentiary hearings and appeals
on such motions. Judge Donnelly,60 writing for the court in Colbert, chose
to ignore the evidence and finding of voluntariness from the 27.26 evidentiary hearing in order to announce that rule 27.26 (e)O' did not even require a hearing in the case. A hearing was unnecessary, said Judge Donnelly,
because the record made at the time of the plea was sufficient to show
conclusively that the defendant pleaded guilty "voluntarily with understanding of the nature of . . . [each] charge." 62 Relying heavily on language in a 1971 federal decision,63 he concluded that under Boykin a good
record 4 made at the time of the plea is sufficient "to insulate ... convictions from subsequent attack in federal habeas corpus proceedings" as well
as from attack under rule 27.26. Unfortunately, the opinion in Colbert
failed to describe the plea record; 65 why the case was thought to be an
ters outside the record of the arraignment which cannot be conclusively
resolved by reference to that record ....

Id. (emphasis added).
58. Mo. SuP.

CT.

R. 27.26 (e) provides:

Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show
that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, a prompt hearing thereon shall
be held. ....

This hearing shall be an evidentiary hearing if issues of

fact are raised in the motion, and if the allegations thereof directly contradict the verity of records of the court, that issue shall be determined in
the evidentiary hearing.... (emphasis added).

59. 486 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. 1972).
60. Judge Donnelly wrote a precursory concurring opinion in Flood v. State,
476 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1972). There, he suggested that Missouri courts follow an
outlined procedure, based on a recommended federal procedure under rule 11,
as a prerequisite to accepting any guilty plea. He cited Missouri v. Turley, 443
F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1971) because it contained an expansive interpretation of
Boykin that "invites the trial judges of Missouri to utilize a procedure which could
insulate most guilty pleas from successful subsequent attack in Rule 27.25 and 27.26
proceedings, and in federal habeas corpus proceedings." 476 S.W.2d at 537. The
court in Colbert also cited Turley, 486 S.W.2d at 220.
61. Note 58 supra.
62. 486 S.W.2d at 221.
63. Missouri v. Turley, 443 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 965
(1971); note 60 supra.
64. Apparently the state court must, at the time of accepting a plea, elicit "sufficient information from the parties so that the propriety of accepting the plea is
established in a manner analogous to the dictates of Rule 11." 486 S.W.2d at 221,
quoting from Missouri v. Turley, 443 F.2d 1313, 1318 (8th Cir. 1971). See Flood
v. State, 476 S.W.2d 529, 537 (Mo. 1972) (concurring opinion) for a list of recommended procedures for conducting a guilty plea proceeding "which could insulate
most guilty pleas from successful subsequent attack."
65. The Colbert opinion is one page long. Ordinarily the supreme court sets
out important parts, or a summary, of the plea record when a movant attacks a
plea of guilty in order to show why the lower court's finding of voluntariness was
not dearly erroneous. In Colbert, Judge Donnelly failed even to set out the grounds
for relief alleged in the 27.26 motion. 486 S.W.2d at 220.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/6

12

Anderson: Anderson: Post-Conviction Relief in Missouri
1973]

POST CONVICTION RELIEF

"opportunity to eliminate from post-conviction judicial process in Missouri
much unnecessary and time-consuming activity" 66 is uncertain.
Although Colbert may appear to be an aberrational decision with
little precedential value, the court seems determined to follow the Colbert
approach in some situations. In Pauley v. State67 the circuit court summarily denied a 27.26 motion attacking the voluntariness of a guilty plea.
The supreme court held that the circuit court had properly denied an
evidentiary hearing because "the transcript conclusively shows that appellant is entitled to no relief and is sufficient to insulate the plea of guilty
from subsequent attack in collateral proceedings, under Boykin v. Alabama"6 s The court explained its decision:
The allegation that counsel told petitioner that the most time he
would receive would be 7 years ...did not require an evidentiary
hearing because, even if true, the record dearly shows that the
court disabused petitioner of any such idea .... Neither in the
presence of the court, nor in private interview with the officer of
the state board of probation and parole in the course of the presentence investigation, did he mention the 7-year limit his attorney
is now alleged to have placed on the punishment he would receive.
We have concluded that this contention is an afterthought, thrown
69
in his 27.26 motion for good measure.
The opinion in Pauley also contains essential portions of the plea proceeding record; 70 it thereby indicates how far a court must go in personally
66. Id. On appeal, Colbert argued that the evidence adduced at the 27.26
hearing showed that the prosecuting attorney promised leniency in exchange for
Colbert's guilty plea. Further, he argued that it showed that he pleaded guilty
because he thought the prosecutor would recommend a five-year sentence; the
prosecutor made no such recommendation. Brief for Appellant at 1, id. Thus, he
had challenged the record made at the time of the plea; that record showed that
he answered "no" upon the inquiry: "Has there been any statement by any official other than your counsel indicating.., that if you do enter a plea the Court
will be easier on you than if you stand trial?" Brief for Respondent at 7, id. Despite
this record, Judge Donnelly evidently thought the plea record was sufficient to
decide the issue of voluntariness on the merits without a hearing. Perhaps Colbert
did not sufficiently allege in his 27.26 motion "the facts which support ... the
grounds... and the names . . . of the witnesses or other evidence upon which
[he intended] to rely to prove such facts." Mo. SUP. CT. R. 27.26 (c) and appended

form. See Pauley v. State, 487 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1972) (no issues of fact raised).
However, even if his allegations of fact did not "directly contradict the verity of
records of the court" (Mo. Sup. CT. R. 27.26 (e)), his evidence at the 27.26 hearing
was directly contradictory of part of the plea record. Colbert should have been decided on the basis of the 27.26 hearing record rather than on the basis of the plea
record and the possibly inadequate 27.26 motion.
67. 487 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1972).
68. Id. at 566, citing Missouri v. Turley, 443 F.2d 1313, 1318 (8th Cir. 1971),
and Colbert v. State, 486 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. 1972).
69. 487 S.W.2d at 567. Note the use of the presentence investigation record in
making this determination.
70. Id. Key portions of the plea proceedings included the following questions and answers:
To the question "Has anyone told you or promised or suggested to you
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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questioning and informing the defendant in order to insulate the plea of
guilty from subsequent attack. More decisions like Pauley would help
courts, attorneys, and 27.26 movants determine when a plea record is good
enough to "conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief."71
Recent Missouri and federal decisions show clearly that prospects for
obtaining post-conviction relief after a plea of guilty are rapidly diminishing. The courts are developing better procedures for accepting guilty pleas;
consequently, they give greater weight to good plea records.72 Courts are
now developing better "plea hearings" that both protect the defendant and
reduce the need for post-conviction hearings and judicial review.
B. Denial of Effective Assistance of Counsel
The second most frequent complaint of 27.26 movants is that they
lacked "effective assistance" of counsel. 7s Prisoners made this complaint
in 130 of the 325 appeals decided in the past 5 years. This ground must be
distinguished from the related claim of denial of counsel at a critical stage
of the criminal proceedings, 7 4 which movants raised less frequently.la Despite the frequency of the complaint, the supreme court granted no major
relief on this ground in any of the 130 appeals;76 it ordered minor relief
that you would receive a lighter sentence or probation or parole or any
other favors to get you to say you are guilty of this charge?" petitioner
answered "No sir." To the question "You understand that any agreements
or proposals between yourself, your attorney, and the Prosecuting Attorney are not binding on the Court, it's up to me to determine what to do
in your case?" petitioner answered "Yes, I do." . . . To the question "And
you are not pleading guilty under any duress, coercion, or compulsion,
or because of any promises, inducements, or representations, is that correct?" petitioner answered "Yes, sir."
Id. Note the "leading" nature of the last question; see note 36 supra for possible
problems with this approach.
71. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 27.26 (e). Brief opinions like the one in Henderson v.
State, 487 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. 1972) (issue submitted on the plea transcript) furnish
no guidance to lower courts or to attorneys advising prospective 27.26 movants.
72. See Note, Post-Conviction Relief from Pleas of Guilty: A Diminishing
Right, 38 BRoox.LxN L. Rv. 182 (1971). The authors of the note suggest adoption
of qualitative rules for the acceptance of guilty pleas to better protect defendants
who have had marginal legal representation. They recognize, however, that brief
plea proceedings offer a defendant minimal protection, because they often have
little fact-finding value. Thus, a need for post-conviction judicial review of guilty
pleas will continue to exist, even in cases where a good plea record was made.
73. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; Mo. GoNsr. art. I, §§ 10, 18 (a). Most
decisions are based on federal constitutional precedents.
Prisoners complain of involuntary pleas and denial of effective assistance of
counsel three times as often as they raise any of the next three grounds for relief
discussed: Denial of counsel at a critical stage (pt. III, § C of this article); illegal
procurement or use of an incriminating statement (pt. IV, § D of this article); and
lack of jurisdiction because of a defective indictment or information (pt. IV, § E of
this article).
74. U.S. CoNsT. amends. VI, XXV and Mo. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 10, 18 (a) provide
the basis for relief in "no counsel" as well as "inadequate counsel" situations.
75. Thirty-nine out of 325 appeals involved this claim.
76. The state obtained relief on appeal in State v. Frey, 441 S.W.2d 11 (Mo.
1969), after the trial court had ordered the movant discharged because he had been
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/6
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in the form of remands for evidentiary hearings in 2 decisions.77 Perhaps
the popularity of this ground for relief is partly due- to 3 related federal
cases in which "ineffective assistance of counsel" provided a basis for habeas
corpus relief. 78 However, the federal courts rejected the claim in 16 out of
20 cases and granted minor relief in 1 case.7 9
Given the Missouri appellate record, it can be assumed that most claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel are frivolous, at least by current standards for determining the issue. The supreme court noted this in several
extreme cases.8 0 The basic obstacles to relief are summarized in State v.
Worley. 8s
[T]he constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel
does not vest in the accused the right to the services of an attorney
who meets any specified aptitude test in point of professional skill.
And common mistakes of judgment on the part of counsel, common mistakes of strategy, or common errors of policy in the course
of a criminal case do not constitute grounds for collateral attack
upon the judgment and sentence ....It is instances in which resulting from the substandard level of the services of the attorney
the trial becomes mockery and farcical that the judgment is open
to collateral attack ....82
Even uncommon mistakes seldom provide a basis for relief under this vague
"farce and mockery" standard8 3 that state and federal courts generally apdeprived of effective assistance of counsel after conviction. The supreme court
limited the relief to vacating the sentence and resentencing so that movant could
appeal after resentencing.
77. Holbert v. State, 439 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1969); State v. Keeble, 427 S.W.2d
404 (Mo. 1968).
78. Turley v. Swenson, 314 F. Supp. 1304 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Pedicord v.
Swenson, 304 F. Supp. 393 (W.D. Mo. 1969), afrd on other grounds, 431 F.2d 92
(8th Cir. 1970); Brizendine v. Swenson, 302 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
79. Renfro v. Swenson, 315 F. Supp. 733 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (suggested expansion of state hearing to include this claim).
80. E.g., Aguilar v. State, 452 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Mo. 1970) (movant admitted
ground included at insistence of fellow prisoner); Dickson v. State, 449 S.W.2d 576
(Mo. 1970), where the court stated:
The attribution of incompetent or ineffective counsel will come as a surprise to the bar at large and is perhaps a bit of a shock to these six renowned trial lawyers-all with more than state-wide reputations.... [Tlhis
proceeding is another of a large and increasing number of instances of the
depths to which post-conviction remedies have been degraded. In short,
this is all but a frivolous appeal in a proceeding in circumstances not
within the contemplation and spirit of the post-conviction remedies.
ld. at 583.
81. 371 S.W.2d 221 (Mo. 1963).
82. Id. at 224 (emphasis added), quoting and relying on Frand v. United
States, 301 F.2d 102, 103 (10th Cir. 1962). Subsequent Missouri decisions have
cited this standard. See, e.g., Holt v. State, 433 S.W.2d 265, 267 (Mo. 1968).
83. The same standard is often stated in other language. E.g., Cardarella v.
United States, 375 F.2d 222, 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967), where
the court used the formula "made the proceedings a farce and mockery of justice,
shocking to the conscience of the Court." The Missouri Supreme Court relied on
Cardarellain Jackson v. State, 465 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Mo. 1971).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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ply to determine whether the defendant lacked effective assistance of counsel.
Recently the standard has come under attack. Judge Seiler, concurring
in Jackson v. State,84 stated his disapproval of the test:
I continue to have grave doubts about the usefulness of the socalled "farce and mockery" test and believe it offers little, if any,
guide to the practicing lawyer who is appointed to represent an
indigent defendant. "Farce and mockery" are so extreme and so
rare that they may mislead a lawyer into believing the court intends to set some lower standard for representing indigents than it
does other litigants ...."Mockery and farce" does not fit an analysis of whether a lawyer has used normal competence in getting
ready for trial.8 5

In McQueen v. State,s" a later case, the court observed how poor the
"mockery and farce" test is when the complaint focuses on inadequate preparation for trial. In McQueen, a murder case in which defendant's counsel admitted that he interviewed none of the 25 state's witnesses prior to trial because he had "never been one to go out and interview [state's witnesses],"87
the court denied relief because defendant did not clearly show that counsel's
failure to investigate was prejudicial to him. The court concluded:
The circumstances of this case do not demonstrate that the trial
court's conclusion that the failure on the part of defense counsel to
interview the state's witnesses did not prevent defendant from having a fair trial and that there was no proof that representation of
defendant was inadequate was clearly erroneous."8
Under this approach a movant must show not only that counsel's preparation for trial was inadequate, but also that he was denied a "fair trial" as
a result." 9 If the lower court concludes as a matter of law that counsel's
failures did not deprive the defendant of a "fair trial," it will probably
find a failure to prove inadequate representation; and the supreme court
will sustain those conclusions unless they are "clearly erroneous."0 0
84. 465 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1971).
85. Id. at 647-48.
86. 475 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. En Banc 1971).
87. Id. at 112.
88. Id. at 115.
89. Concurring in the result, Chief Justice Finch wrote an opinion explain.
ing that while most courts continue to cite the "farce and mockery" test, he believes they usually seek to ascertain whether there was a denial of a fair trial. Chief
Justice Finch stated:
The question we must determine here is whether, as a result of the conduct
of counsel, appellant should be granted a new trial on the basis that he
was improperly convicted as a result of not having had a fair trial.
Id. at 117.
Judge Donnelly, in dissent, agreed that the trial court should apply a "fair
trial" standard to determine claims of ineffectiveness of counsel, but he believed
that the supreme court should remand the case for a redetermination under the
standard. Id. at 119.
90. In a strong dissent, Judge Seller stated that 4ie conclusion of the trial
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/6
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Recently the supreme court has indicated that it may currently follow
a different standard for determining claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. In O'Neal v. State,91 the court applied the following test: "The
'circumstances must [but in this case do not] demonstrate that which
amounts to a lawyer's deliberate abdication of this [sic] ethical duty to his
client.' "192

While this test has the advantage of focusing on the lawyer's ethical
obligation to fairly represent the defendant, 93 it makes it unduly difficult
for a defendant to establish inadequate representation. Few lawyers would
94
admit that they consciously abdicated their ethical duties to the defendant.
If the defendant can establish that no reasonable basis existed for the
conduct of counsel that is attacked, and if this conduct may have affected
the outcome of the case, the state of mind of the lawyer should be irrelevant.0 5
As long as Missouri courts follow the "farce and mockery," "deliberate abdication of ethical duty," or "fair trial" tests for determining the
adequacy of assistance of counsel, few 27.26 movants will obtain relief on
this ground in the trial courts, even in dear cases of negligence that probably had some effect on the outcome of the case. On appeal, application

court on the issue of ineffective assistance was dearly erroneous. Id. at 120. Again,
as in the Jackson case (see text accompanying notes 84, 85 supra) he was concerned
about furnishing guidance to appointed lawyers:
[On] the record counsel did not meet the standard of normal competence.
Endorsement of the kind of representation which was provided here
would lead to relaxation of the standards adopted by the court, particularly Canon 6 and DR 6-101 (A) (2). Relaxation of this standard degrades the

administration of justice and burdens the courts and public, as well as
imperiling Sixth Amendment rights of an accused.
Id. On the matter of prejudice. Judge Seiler cited the leading case on right to
counsel, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), where the Supreme Court said:
It is not enough to assume that counsel... exercised their best judgment
in proceeding to trial without preparation. Neither they nor the court
could say what a prompt and thorough-going investigation might disclose
as to the facts.
Id. at 58.
91. 486 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. 1972).
92. Id. at 208 (emphasis added). The court took the quoted test from Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1971). The Robinson court elaborated
on the test: "There must be such conscious conduct as to render pretextual an
attorney's legal obligation to fairly represent the defendant." Id. at 1256. The first
Missouri case relying on the Robinson test was Smith v. State, 473 S.W.2d 719 (Mo.
1971).
93. See note 90 supra.
94. Without an admission from the lawyer, proving ineffective assistance
would be very difficult. In the McQueen case (see notes 86-88 and accompanying text
supra) counsel would probably not have admitted to deliberate abdication of his
ethical duty to prepare adequately for trial. His "strategy" in the case and his failure
to interview any state witnesses appeared to be negligent, but probably not "de-

liberate abdication."
95. See Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process,

54 MINN. L. REv. 1175, 1263 (1970).
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of the subjective "dearly erroneous" limitation further reduces the chances
of relief.96
C. Denial of Counsel at a Critical Stage
Prisoners complained of denial of counsel at a critical stage of the
criminal proceedings in 39 of the 325 appeals decided in the last 5 years.

The supreme court granted major relief in 2 of these casesOT and minor relief in 1 case.9 s In 20 of the 39 cases the movant combined this complaint
with the closely related complaint of ineffective assistance of counsel. 99
None of the 7 subsequent federal decisions involving this contention
granted major relief.100
In most cases it is easy to determine whether the defendant had counsel
at a particular stage of the proceedings. If the defendant did not have
counsel, the state usually contends that he waived his right to counsel' 01
or that the stage was not "critical" in the particular caseO 2 or in general.103
In 15 of the 39 appeals the Supreme Court considered complaints that
the right to counsel had been denied at the preliminary hearing 0 4 or at the
time the hearing was waived. 106 In almost all of these cases the preliminary

96. When the lower court "feels" that the trial was not a "farce or mockery,"
or that the defendant was not denied a "fair trial," fewe appellate judges could
"feel" with any assurance that this judgment was "dearly erroneous." The "clearly
erroneous" standard, first announced in the leading case of Crosswhite v. State, 426
S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1968), is essentially a subjective test:
A finding is "dearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
Id. at 70-71, quoting from United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
395 (1948).
97. Ball v. State, 479 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. 1972) (judgment and sentence set
aside, remanded so that motion for new trial with counsel's assistance could be
filed); Morris v. State, 456 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. 1970) (denial of counsel at time of
plea, no waiver of right shown).
98. Garrett v. State, 459 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. 1970) (hearing to determine if represented by counsel in prior case of conviction).
99. E.g., Tucker v. State, 481 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1972); State v. Bobbitt, 465
S.W.2d 579 (Mo. En Banc 1971).
100. In Garrett v. Swenson, 459 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1972), the court of appeals
relied on a recent decision, United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972), in holding
that the petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
trial court had considered an invalid conviction in imposing sentence. The petitioner had alleged denial of counsel in connection with a 1952 conviction.
101. E.g., McBride v. State, 484 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. 1972); Meller v. State, 438
S.W.2d 187 (Mo. 1969).

102. E.g., Montgomery v. State, 461 S.W.2d 844 (Mo. 1971) (arraignment);
Collins v. State, 454 S.W.2d 917 (Mo. 1970) (arraignment).
103. E.g., State v. Grapper, 484 S.W.2d 234 (Mo. 1972) (no right to counsel
during medical examination); Fields v. State, 466 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. 1971) (nitrate
test not critical stage).
104. E.g., Carpenter v. State, 479 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1972); Sallee v. State, 460
S.W.2d 554 (Mo. 1970); Harroald v. State, 438 S.W.2d 202 (Mo. 1969).
105. E.g., Veneri v. State, 474 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1971); Hegvood v. State, 465
S.W.2d 476 (Mo. 1971).
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10 6
hearings had been held prior to the decision in Coleman v. Alabama, in
which the Supreme Court determined that such hearings constitute a "critical stage" in the criminal process. When Coleman does not apply, the court
will examine the record to determine whether the denial of counsel at the
10 7
hearing was prejudicial to the defendant.
Assuming that the 27.26 movant establishes the absence of counsel at a
critical stage, he is entitled to relief unless the state produces evidence of
08
or of a
a voluntary and understanding waiver of the right to counsel'
10 9
If the state prowaiver of the constitutional defect in later proceedings.
duces evidence of waiver, the burden falls on the movant to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was involuntary, unintelli0
gent, or based on a lack of understanding."1 Movants who have nothing
more than their own testimony to support their "improper waiver" con1
tendons should expect to lose in most cases."

D. Involuntary Confession or Statement
Prisoners complained that the state obtained a statement or confession
by unconstitutional means, 112 including failure to give adequate warn106. 399 U.S. 1 (1970). The Court held that the preliminary hearing is a
"critical stage" in Alabama's criminal process; the accused is as much entitled to the
aid of counsel at that time as at the trial itself. Coleman will not apply retroactively to preliminary hearings conducted prior to June 22, 1970, the date of the decision.
Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972).
107. E.g., Norris v. State, 449 S.W.2d 606 (Mo. 1970); Harris v. State, 446
S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1969).
108. In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), the Supreme Court held that
to presume waiver of counsel from a silent record is impermissible. The record
must show, or an allegation and evidence must show, that the defendant intelligently and understandingly rejected an offer of counsel.
In Meller v. Swenson, 309 F. Supp. 519 (W.D. Mo. 1969), affd sub nom. Meller
v. Missouri, 431 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1970), the court summarizes the law on "burden
of proof" in post-conviction review of alleged denial of fundamental constitutional rights. The supreme court follows the federal approach. Morris v. State, 456
S.W.2d 289 (Mo. 1970).
109. In Missouri a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional, procedural, and
constitutional infirmities in prior stages of the proceeding. E.g., Geren v. State,
473 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. 1971) (waiver of preliminary hearing, told no attorney would

be appointed); State v. Brown, 449 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. 1970) (illegal evidence). For
the federal view, see McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
110. Meller v. Swenson, 309 F. Supp. 519, 524 (W.D. Mo. 1969); Mo. Sup. CT.
R. 27.26 (f).
111. In Meller v. State, 438 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. 1969), the supreme court recog-

nized a "presumptive regularity" of a court judgment and record at the time of a
plea of guilty. Id. at 192. For a movant to attack a court record successfully is
almost impossible, even though rule 27.26 (e) permits a movant to have an evidentiary hearing if his allegations "directly contradict the verity of records of the court."
112. Prior to Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court had defined involuntariness of confessions
and statements in terms of physical or psychological pressures that overcome the
suspect's will to remain silent. Failure to warn the suspect of his right to silence,
or to allow him access to counsel, were simply relevant factors in determining the
issue of voluntariness. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1963);
Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601-02 (1961).
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ings as required by Miranda v. Arizona,118 in 41 of the 325 appeals decided
in the last 5 years. The supreme court granted no major or minor post-conviction relief in any of these appeals. Of the five prisoners who later sought
federal habeas corpus relief, two succeeded. 114
In 24 of the 41 cases, the 27.26 movants combined an attack on an
involuntary confession or statement with an attack on the voluntariness of their guilty pleas. Typically, the movant alleged that the plea of
guilty was the product of an involuntary confession and that both the
plea and the confession were involuntary."85 An allegation that a movant
gave an involuntary confession or statement before he pleaded guilty
provides no basis for collateral attack;"16 a plea of guilty voluntarily
and understandingly made waives all constitutional and nonjurisdictional
defects in prior proceedings. 117 An involuntary confession or statement is
a factor to be considered, however, in determining whether a subsequent
plea of guilty was voluntarily and understandingly made. 18 A defendant
may plead guilty "voluntarily and understandingly" even though he is unaware at the time of the plea that his prior confession was involuntary and
inadmissible."10
In the remaining 17 appeals in this area (those not involving pleas of
guilty), the supreme court often did not resolve the involuntary confession
issue on the merits. Rather, the court sometimes cited and apparently relied
on a state doctrine of "procedural default,"' 2 0 as distinguished from true
113. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
114. Renfro v. Swenson, 315 F. Supp. 733 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (plenary hearing
on issue in state trial court, or a new trial); Gray v. Swenson, 302 F. Supp. 1162
(W.D. Mo. 1969), af'd, 480 F.2d 9 (8th Cir. 1970) (plenary hearing on issue, state
waiver rule rejected).
115. E.g., Lee v. State, 460 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1970) (coerced confession); Jefferson v. State, 442 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1969) (fear confession would be used).
116. E.g., Wright v. State, 476 S.W.2d 605 (Mo. 1972); Nolan v. State, 446
S.W.2d 754 (Mo. 1969).
117. E.g., Mitchell v. State, 447 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1969); Jefferson v. State, 442
S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1969); Turley v. State, 439 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1969). See McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
118. Redus v. State, 470 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1971). Apparently this is an unimportant factor in most cases, because the court often assumes for the sake of argu.
ment that there was an involunary confession prior to the plea of guilty. See, e.g.,
McClure v. State, 470 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1971); Lee v. State, 460 S.W.2d 564 (Mo.
1970).
119. Mitchell v. State, 447 S.W.2d 281, 283-84 (Mo. 1969). The court relied
on the leading case of Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1958); in
that case, the court concluded:
It may be argued that a plea of guilty is not understandingly made when
defendant is unaware of certain technical defenses which might very well
make the prosecutor's job more difficult or even impossible were he put to
his proof. However, we think "understandingly" refers merely to the meaning of the charge, and what acts amount to being guilty of the charge,
and the consequences of pleading guilty thereto, rather than to dilatory
or evidentiary defenses.
Id. at 710.
120. Under a "procedural default" doctrine, litigants who may otherwise have
valid claims are automatically denied relief because of some procedural misstep
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/6
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"waiver,"' 21 in order to avoid a decision on the merits. In State v. Gray,122
after the defendant testified, the prosecution used his statement on crossexamination. 123 Defense counsel objected to partial use of the statement
and offered to "read the whole statement from start to finish."'124 Defendant Gray then testified that he was willing to have the whole statement
submitted to the jury. Defendant raised the involuntary statement issue for
the first time in the 27.26 motion. 125 After the trial court found "waiver,"' 2 0
the supreme court affirmed, stating:
We hold on this record that the appellant understandingly and intelligently waived his right to have a preliminary determination by
the Court as to voluntariness by his failure to object to the use of
the statement and by expressly offering to agree and agreeing that
27
the statement be read to the jury in its entirety1
Although the court professed to rely on the federal waiver principles of
Johnson v. Zerbst12 8 and Fay v. Noia,129 it also quoted the Missouri "proce-

at an earlier stage of the litigation. In determining whether a procedural default
bars a later determination on the merits, courts ordinarily do not check carefully
to see whether the previous misstep was intentional and inexcusable. The concept

of "waiver" discussed in the succeeding footnote is frequently confused with the
forfeiture of a remedy because of some "procedural default."
121. Generally, a litigant "waives" a right when he understands it and intel-

ligently relinquishes it. A defendant may waive many rights in a criminal prosecution: e.g., the right to counsel, to have a jury trial, or to have a trial. The elements

of waiver vary, depending on the particular right in question. In the area of post-

conviction relief, the Federal Constitution creates most rights in question; further,

it provides, through court decisions, the definition of what constitutes "waiver" of
the particular rights.
When courts deny relief because of a "procedural default" (note 120 supra),
the litigant loses what may have been a meritorious claim because of a procedural
misstep that is classified as an abuse of process, resulting in a forfeiture of remedy.
On the other hand, denial of relief because of "waiver" involves a decision on the
merits; a right cannot be violated if it has been intelligently and understandingly

relinquished.
122. 432 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1968).
123. Id. at 595.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 595-96.
126. The supreme court construed the trial court's findings that defendant had
"ample opportunity... to object at the trial to any reference to his statements"
and that defendant "failed to show any abuse of his constitutional rights' as a
"determination of voluntary waiver on the part of the appellant." Id. at 597.
127. Id. at 596.
128. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Johnson v. Zerbst is the leading case on the right to
counsel in federal courts under the sixth amendment. The Court held this to be an
absolute right; absent an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege" a court has no jurisdiction to hear a case if it fails to appoint
counsel for an indigent defendant.
129. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Fay is the leading case rejecting state "procedural
default" limitations on federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. The Court held that
state prisoners are not automatically precluded from raising in federal habeas corpus
proceedings those constitutional issues that the state court had refused to consider
because of the defendant's failure to comply with state procedural rules. The pris-
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dural default" case of State v. Meiers:130
Our rule is that constitutional questions must be raised in the trial
court at the earliest opportunity consistent with orderly procedure;
they may not be raised for the first time in the appellate court. The
defendant in a criminal case, if he proposes to raise a question pertaining to the violation of such right, must object to the introduction of his confession or admission, clearly and specifically stating his constitutional grounds for the objection ....In other words,
his constitutional grounds for objection must be kept alive and
preserved throughout the case.... To abandon these rules would
be to invite a defendant to sit back, elect not to object to his constitutionally inadmissible confession or admission, take his chances
that the verdict might be acquittal; then, if the verdict is adverse,
raise the question of denial of constitutional rights for the first
time on appeal with some assurance that the case would be remanded. Only by adhering to these rules and decisions may we
prevent such tactics.' 31
Despite dual state findings of "waiver" and "procedural default" in
Gray, defendant Gray sought and obtained federal habeas corpus relief in
Gray v. Swenson.132 The federal district court, under an obligation to ex-

amine the facts to determine whether there was true waiver or a "deliberate
by-passing of state procedures,"' 3 3 found no evidence to support the state
finding of waiver. 13 4 Trial counsel's failure to object properly to the use of
the statement did not preclude relief, because the state introduced no evidence of a deliberate by-pass by the defendant himself.'8 5 The court held
that defendant Gray was entitled to a plenary state evidentiary hearing on
oner must exhaust all state remedies still open to him, however, before he files his
application for federal habeas corpus. Id. at 435.
Although state procedural defaults do not affect federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, the decision in Fay gives the judge in federal habeas corpus proceedings
discretion to "deny relief to an appellant who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court rem-

edies." Id. at 438. The controlling standard for the exercise of this discretion is the
classic definition of waiver in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), and the following explanation in Fay:
If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or
otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forwent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the
deliberate by-passing of state procedures, then it is open to the federal
court on habeas to deny him all relief if the state courts refused to entertain his federal claims on the merits-though of course only after the
federal court has satisfied itself ... of the facts bearing upon the applicants default.
Id. at 439.
130. 412 S.W.2d 478 (Mo. 1967) ("plain error" rule not applied on direct
appeal from conviction).
131. State v. Gray, 432 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Mo. 1968).
132. 302 F. Supp. 1162 (W.D. Mo. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 9 (8th Cir. 1970).
133. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 439 (1963).
134. 302 F. Supp. at 1167.
135. Id. at 1168.
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the issue of the voluntariness of his statement in accordance with the standards articulated in Jackson v. Denno.136
The statement in State v. Meiers' 37 that the defendant must "clearly and
specifically [state] his constitutional grounds for the objection" provides
the basis for another "procedural default" rule applicable to post-conviction
proceedings as well as to direct appeals. In State v. Price'3 8 the court held
that defense counsel's objection that defendant "was not fully advised of
his constitutional rights" prior to giving a statement was too broad to preserve for appellate review the question of whether all required Miranda
warnings had been given.' 3 9 In Evans v. State, 40 a poorly argued case, the
court extended this rule to prevent state collateral attack; once again, however, this rule of "procedural default" did not prevent the federal courts
4
from deciding the issue on the merits.' '
When a defendant or his counsel fails to raise or preserve a constitutional issue properly in the trial court, this ordinarily does not represent
an "abuse of process," i.e., a "deliberate by-passing of state procedures,"
perhaps with the intention to raise the issue later. 42 However, under the
many "procedural default" rules that the decision in State v. Meiers' 43 and
its progeny suggest, a court may automatically conclude that defendant engaged in an "abuse of process" justifying denial of post-conviction relief.
The 27.26 movant may not even have a chance to show that he did not "deliberately by-pass" an earlier state procedure for vindication of his consti136. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
137. 412 S.W.2d 478 (Mo. 1967).
138. 422 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. 1967).
139. The court stated: "He [the defendant] is required to be as specific in
stating the grounds or reasons for his objection as the authorities are required to
be specific in advising him of each of his rights." Id. at 289.
140. 465 S.W.2d 500 (Mo. 1971). The defendant offered no argument or auithority for his request that the court re-examine the Price decision.
141. Evans v. Swenson, 455 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1972). In dictum, the Missouri
Supreme Court had said that the warning given to the defendant did not meet
the Miranda requirements. State v. Evans, 439 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Mo. 1969). However, the court of appeals in Evans v. Swenson held that the warnings complied
with Miranda and that defendant "knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to have retained or appointed counsel
present at the interrogation." 455 F.2d at 296.
142. Automatic "procedural default" rules applicable to post-conviction relief
are hardly needed as an additional deterrent to "abuse of process" when one considers the many other common sense factors encouraging early assertion of constitutional rights: e.g., the added danger of conviction if the defendant does not
assert all available rights; the probability that the assertion of an issue for the
first time on appeal will be unsuccessful; the time spent in prison waiting for
a 27.26 hearing; and the probability that a court will be able to spot a "deliberate
by-pass" or will not believe a defendant who, although properly advised by counsel, never previously asserted the alleged ground for relief.
The drafters of the ABA Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies
state that "[albuse of process should always be an affirmative defense, pleaded
and proved by the state, and cautiously invoked." ABA STANDAIS RExLATING TO
Posr-CoNvrariON Rmfxms § 6.1, Commentary at 89-90 (Approved Draft, 1968).
143. 412 S.W.2d 478 (Mo. 1967); see text accompanying notes 130 & 131 supra.
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tutional rights until he reaches a federal court; 144 if no deliberate by-pass
is found, the federal court may have to hold an evidentiary hearing before
14
it can determine the c6nstitutional claim on its merits. 5
E. Defective Formal Charge-Jurisdiction
A basic constitutional requirement of our system of criminal justice
is that the defendant "be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation"146 against him. To be effective, the formal indictment or information must set forth the constituent elements of the crime charged and sufficiently apprise the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet. It must
also be sufficient to protect the defendant from being put in jeopardy twice
147
for the same offense.
In 36 of the 325 post-conviction appeals decided in Missouri in the
last 5 years, prisoners complained that the formal charge against them,
either an indictment or a prosecuting attorney's information, was so insufficient or defective that the court lacked jurisdiction to convict or sentence
them. 148 The court granted major relief in 3 cases1 4 9 and minor relief
144. See Evans v. Swenson, 455 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1972); Renfro v. Swenson,
315 F. Supp. 733 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Gray v. Swenson, 302 F. Supp. 1162 (W.D.
Mo. 1969), affd, 430 F.2d 9 (8th Cir. 1970).
145. This is a prime reason why Missouri should adopt ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CoNVICtIoN REm IES § 6.1 (b) (d) (Approved Draft, 1968), which
provides:
(b) Claims advanced in post-conviction applications should be decided on
their merits, even though they might have been, but were not fully and
finally litigated in the proceedings leading to judgments of conviction.
(d) Because of the special importance of rights subject to vindication in
post-conviction proceedings, courts should be reluctant to deny relief to
meritorious claims on procedural grounds. In most instances of unmeritorious claims, the litigation will be simplified and expedited if the court

reaches the underlying merits despite possible procedural flaws. (emphasis added).

146. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Mo. CONsr. art. I, § 18 (a): "[I]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation. ...

147. The common law rule, requiring the criminal charge to be set out
with sufficient precision and fulness to enable the defendant to make his
defense and to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, has been crystallized in the
United States Constitution and in the constitutions of a great majority
of the United States.
R. MoRELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROcErRua 211 (1959).
148. E.g., O'Neal v. State, 486 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. 1972) (27 separate contentions
on this, mostly trivial); Johnson v. State, 485 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1972) (amended information allegedly charging different offense); Veneri v. State, 474 S.W.2d 833
(Mo. 1971) (mistake in judgment, inconsistent with information); DeLuca v.
State, 465 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1971) (alleged insufficient second offender allegation); Wilkinson v. State, 461 S.W.2d 283 (Mo. 1970) (defective information, leave
to amend); Russell v. State, 446 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. 1969) (incorrect date of offense);
Meller v. State, 438 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. 1969); State v. Ball, 432 S.W.2d 265 (Mo.
1968) (vagueness as to building burglarized).
Four of the prisoners unsuccessfully sought federal habeas corpus relief on
this ground. Keeny v. Swenson, 458 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1972) (verdict and informa.
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in 1.15 0 The court granted relief only in extreme cases. 151 Moreover,
152
movants may face the obstacle of waiver.
Most prisoner complaints of this nature are highly technical and
frivolous, 1 53 often because the prisoner files a pro se 27.26 motion and

insists that his subsequently appointed counsel retain the contention in the
motion.' 5 4 When a prisoner tries to make a case from an obvious mistake in
the record, the supreme court will point out why the complaint is excessively
technical. 155
Many post-conviction complaints about the formal charge would not
be made' 56 if prisoners and their lawyers would examine Missouri Supreme
tion inconsistent, no federal question); Deckard v. Swenson, 335 F. Supp. 992 (W.D.
Mo. 1971) (no exhaustion of state remedies, dismissal); Wilkinson v. Haynes, 827

F. Supp. 967 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (proposed amendment by interlineation, sufficiently informed of charge); Holland v. Swenson, 305 F. Supp. 1093 (W.D. Mo.
1969) (no exhaustion of state remedies, dismissal).
149. Bullington v. State, 459 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. 1970) (indictment insufficient,

new trial); Montgomery v. State, 454 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1970) (no information on
file at time of plea, no jurisdiction); State v. Dixon, 434 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1968)
(second offense hearing, resentencing or new trial).
150. State v. Garner, 432 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1968) (judgment set aside although sentence commuted).
151. In Montgomery v. State, 454 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1970), the prosecuting
attorney failed to file a robbery information before the defendant pleaded guilty
to robbery. Obviously the defendant could not read or waive the reading of a
nonexistent charge; moreover, a court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter until a formal charge is on file. In Bullington v. State, 459 S.W.2d 334 (Mo.
1970), and State v. Garner, 432 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1968), the formal charges did
not contain an essential element of the crime.
152. A plea of guilty waives some types of defects in the formal charge. See, e.g.,
Miller v. State, 473 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1971) (information allegedly signed by an
unauthorized person); Walster v. State, 438 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1969) (clerical error,
date on information).
Where the formal charge sufficiently alleges "the essential facts constituting
the offense charged but fails to inform the defendant of the particulars of the
offense sufficiently to prepare his defense," the defendant should move for a bill
of particulars. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 24.03. Failure to move for a bill of particulars
waives any insufficiency as to such details. Abercrombie v. State, 457 S.W.2d 758
(Mo. 1970); State v. Frankum, 425 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. 1968).
153. E.g., O'Neal v. State, 486 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. 1972) (27 separate contentions, mostly trivial); Gavallaro v. State, 465 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1971) (plea to second
degree murder, no information specifically charging that offense); State v. Holland,
438 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. 1969) (assault plea, not clear whether gun used to shoot
or as dub).
154. In Tucker v. State, 481 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1972), movant alleged that the
information charging stealing was defective because it failed to allege that the
defendant took the property from a "person," failed to allege "ownership," and
failed to state "where" the offense occurred. The court found all the allegations
dearly sufficient, however, and added: "These objections are really frivolous, but
it is obvious from viewing the pro se motion that they originated with the defendant himself, and counsel is not to be blamed." Id. at 14.
155. E.g., Veneri v. State, 474 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1971) (mistake in judgment,
can be corrected after the fact); Wilkinson v. State, 461 S.W.2d 283 (Mo. 1970)
(leave to amend defective information, case tried as if amendment made).
156. E.g., Russell v. State, 446 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. 1969) (information contained

improper date of offense).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973

25

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 6
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. -08

Court Rule 24, concerning indictments and informations. 1r 7 Rule 24.11

lists minor imperfections that do "not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits." If the indictment or information is "a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essen-

tial facts constituting the offense charged,"' 5 8 it usually will not be subject
to attack under rule 27.26.

If the Missouri Supreme Court decides to follow federal precedents on
collateral attack of indictments or informations,

59

it will not hold a formal

charge insufficient in the face of collateral attack unless it is "so obviously
defective that by no reasonable construction can it be said to charge the offense for which conviction was had."'160 The position of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is summarized in the leading case of Keto v.
United States:' 61
The rule ... is that the sufficiency of an indictment or information is not open to collateral attack ... unless it appears that the
circumstances are exceptional, that the questions raised are of
"large importance", that the need for the remedy sought is apone of which the sentencparent, and that the offense charged was 62
ing court manifestly had no jurisdiction.
F. Illegal Search and Seizure
Both the United States Constitution 63 and the Missouri Constitution' 6 4 protect the right of the people "to be secure in their persons, papers,
homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures." 05 In accord
with this basic right, the Missouri Supreme Court first held in 1925100 that

evidence obtained as a result of unlawful searches and seizures is subject

to suppression in any criminal prosecution. 16 7 Not until 1961 did the
United States Supreme Court hold, in Mapp. v. Ohio,108 that "all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by
that same authority, inadmissible in a state court."' 69
Prisoners complained of illegal search and seizure in 25 of the 325 post-

157. Rules 24.01 to 24.11 are particularly relevant.
158. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 24.01.
159. The court in DeLuca v. State, 465 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Mo. 1971), relied
heavily on federal cases decided under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1971), upon which rule
27.26 is patterned.
160. Cain v. United States, 349 F.2d 870, 872 (8th Cir. 1965).
161. 189 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1951).
162. Id. at 251.
163. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
164. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 15.
165. Id.
166. State v. Horton, 312 Mo. 202, 278 S.W. 661 (En Banc 1925).
167. See State v. Wilkerson, 349 Mo. 205, 159 S.W.2d 794 (1942) (illegal search
warrant, new trial granted).
168. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
169. Id. at 655.
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170
conviction proceeding appeals decided in Missouri in the last 5 years.
The supreme court granted no relief on this ground, although it considered
the issue on the merits in 11 appeals.171 Later, at least 8 prisoners applied
for federal habeas corpus on illegal search and seizure grounds. Only 1
obtained relief. 17 2 However, the federal courts considered the issue on the
173
merits in 7 of the 8 cases.
The primary obstacle that a prisoner raising a search and seizure issue
must face in attempting to obtain a decision on the merits in a 27.26 proceeding is "procedural default." In State v. Fields,174 the Missouri Supreme
Court stated:

The procedural rules of this state, with an exception not here
material, require that the contention of an unlawful search and
seizure be made by motion to suppress the evidence in advance
of trial .... The validity of a search and the admissibility in evidence of the fruits of that search present issues collateral to the
issue of guilt which are to be tried independently.... He must also
keep the question alive by timely objection.., and by preservation
The only exception
of the issue in a motion for new trial ....
under our procedural rule is where the defendant "had no reason
to anticipate the evidence would be introduced and was surprised."175
Although in Fields the court was avoiding the resolution of a constitutional
issue raised for the first time on direct appeal, the Fields decision became
170. E.g., Schleicher v. State, 483 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. En Banc 1972); Mahurin
v. State, 477 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. En Banc 1972); Smith v. State, 473 S.W.2d 719 (Mo.
1971); Fields v. State, 468 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. 1971); Wilkinson v. State, 461 S.W.2d
283 (Mo. 1970); Mace v. State, 458 S.W.2d 340 (Mo. 1970); State v. Caffey, 457
S.W.2d 657 (Mo. 1970); Collins v. State, 454 S.W.2d 917 (Mo. 1970); Redding v.
State, 452 S.W.2d 229 (Mo. 1970); Stanfield v. State, 442 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1969);

White v. State, 430 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. 1968).
171. Tucker v. State, 482 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. 1972); Fields v. State, 466 S.W.2d
679 (Mo. 1971); McGlathery v. State, 465 S.W.2d 496 (Mo. 1971); Wilkinson v.
State, 461 S.W.2d 283 (Mo. 1970); Mace v. State, 458 S.W.2d 340 (Mo. 1970);
Spica v. State, 457 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. 1970); Redding v. State, 452 S.W.2d 229 (Mo.
1970); Mace v. State, 452 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. 1970); Stanfield v. State, 442 S.W.2d
521 (Mo. 1969); Ciarelli v. State, 441 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. 1969); White v. State, 430
S.W.2d 144 (Mo. 1968). In some of these cases the court noted the procedural
failure of the defendant but decided the issue in spite of it.
172. White v. Swenson, 301 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (writ granted,
new trial or release).
173. Fields v. Swenson, 459 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1972); Keeny v. Swenson, 458
F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1972); Collins v. Swenson, 443 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1971); Caffey
v. Swenson, 332 F. Supp 624 (W.D. Mo. 1971); Gaffey v. Swenson, 318 F. Supp.
704 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Stanfield v. Swenson, 332 F. Supp. 497 (W.D. Mo. 1969);
White v. Swenson, 301 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Mo. 1969). In Deckard v. Swenson,
335 F. Supp. 992 (W.D. Mo. 1971), the court dismissed the application for habeas
corpus without prejudice in order to permit exhaustion of state remedies on another ground for relief.
174. 442 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1969); cf. State v. Meiers, 412 S.W.2d 478 (Mo. 1967)
("procedural default" on involuntary confession issue; on direct appeal).
175. 442 S.W.2d at 33.
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one basis for later search and seizure decisions defining and restricting the
scope of relief available under amended rule 27.26.176
In 1970, the court decided State v. Caffey. 17 7 Defendant Caffey filed no
motion to suppress, made no objection to the admission of the evidence,
and failed to raise the search and seizure issue in his motion for a new
trial.s7 8 The Caffey decision was unusual because the defendant's counsel
consolidated and argued together the appeal from conviction and the
appeal from denial of 27.26 relief. 179 It was also unusual because in the consolidated brief on appeal, Caffey's counsel lumped the two appeals together in argument and apparently "conceded in his brief [that] this
Court has ruled that the scope of postconviction review in Missouri is
governed by the rule of Henry v. Mississippi'8 ... and not by the rule of
Kaufman." 8 1 In conceding this very doubtful point, counsel cited the
Fields case, where the court had appropriately cited Henry in refusing to
176. See Schleicher v. State, 483 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. En Banc 1972). The court in
Schleicher quotes language from State v. Caffey, 457 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Mo. 1970)
that the court in Caffey had quoted from Fields.
177. 457 S.W.2d 657 (Mo. 1970).
178. Id. at 659.
179. The court set aside an earlier affirmance of conviction because Caffey
was not represented by counsel on the original appeal. In the meantime, Caffey
had appealed from a decision overruling his 27.26 motion.
Consolidating an ordinary appeal with a 27.26 appeal could easily result in
a tendency to apply the same "procedural default" rules to post-conviction relief
that are applied in cases of direct appeal. With regard to direct appeals, the case
for a "default" approach in order to encourage the utilization of state procedures
and to cut down on the appellate caseload is compelling; but, determining whether
the law should permit a collateral attack in the state trial court, subject to limited
appellate review under the "clearly erroneous" standard, involves different considerations. A primary consideration is the availability of federal habeas corpus
relief if the state "procedural default" rules restrict the scope of state post-conviction relief. See note 142 supra.
180. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
181. 457 S.W.2d at 660. The case mentioned is Kaufman v. United States, 394
U.S. 217 (1969), where the Supreme Court held that the claim of a federal prisoner
that he was convicted on evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search and
seizure is cognizable in a post-conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1970). Prior to Kaufman, the Missouri Supreme Court had at times relied on
lower federal court decisions holding that prisoners could not raise this issue
under section 2255, because rule 27.26 was based on section 2255. In State v.
Holland, 412 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. 1967), a leading "procedural default" decision on
search and seizure, the court cited not only prior Missouri cases holding that a
prisoner may not raise a claim of illegal search and seizure on collateral attack,
but also cited comparable holdings under section 2255, such as Cox v. United
States, 351 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1965). See text accompanying notes 193-97 infra, for
a discussion of Missouri cases stating a purported absolute proscription against hearing search and seizure questions in 27.26 cases.
Because Kaufman overruled the Cox line of decisions, one could argue that
Missouri should follow suit and overrule the Holland line of decisions. However,
state prisoners were never barred from seeking federal habeas corpus relief on the
unconstitutional search and seizure ground under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). 394
U.S. at 225. As the Kaufman court reasons:
The provision of federal collateral remedies rests ... fundamentally upon
a recognition that adequate protection of constitutional rights relating to
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/6
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decide a search and seizure question on direct appeal where defendant
had not timely raised the issue and kept it alive below.18 2 In Henry, the Supreme Court strongly suggested in dictum that a state procedural ground
is adequate to bar direct review 83 if it serves a legitimate state interest,18 4
but added:
[A] dismissal on the basis of an adequate state ground would not
end this case; petitioner might still pursue vindication of his federal claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding in which the procedural default will not alone preclude consideration of his claim,
at least unless it is shown that the petitioner deliberately bypassed
the orderly procedure of the state courts.13 5
the criminal trial process requires the continuing availability of a mechanism for relief. This is no less true for federal prisoners than it is for state
prisoners.
Id. at 226 (emphasis added).
182. State v. Fields, 442 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Mo. 1969) (appeal); See text accompany notes 174-76 supra. In Fields the appellant argued that by reason of
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969) (applicable to federal prisoners
only), "the contention of unlawful search and seizure can be raised at any time
without regard to state procedural requirements." 442 S.W.2d at 34. Rejecting the
Kaufman decision as irrelevant, the court said, "[We consider the rule set forth
in Henry v. State of Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 ....

to be controlling in this case."

Id. (emphasis added).
183. The Court in Henry was concerned with limiting its certiorari jurisdiction.
184. In State v. Harrington, 435 S.W.2d 318 (Mo. 1968) (appeal), cited by
the court in Fields (442 S.W.2d at 34), the court relied on Henry as holding "that
a state procedural requirement that there be a 'contemporaneous objection' to the
introduction of illegally obtained evidence does serve a legitimate state interest."
435 S.W.2d at 321. The Harrington decision listed the "legitimate state interests"
of Missouri:
[T]o prevent delays during trial in determining collateral issues not bearing on guilt or punishment.... [W]hen no motion is filed before trial
...to indicate to the prosecution that the reasonableness of the search
is not an issue ....

Id.
185. 379 U.S. at 452 (emphasis added).
In Caffey the defendant did not deliberately by-pass his chance to raise the
search and seizure question by motion to suppress. Failing to make this motion
could have gained no possible strategic advantage. Moreover, Caffey's lawyer
admitted that he did not think of or contemplate a motion to suppress because
he was ignorant of the relevant line of cases. 457 S.W.2d at 660-61. By discussing the
issue of deliberate by-pass together with the separate issue of denial of effective
assistance of counsel, the court avoided directly addressing the deliberate by-pass
issue and indicated that Caffey would have to show that the legal representation
was "so woefully inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court and make the
proceedings a farce and mockery of justice" before the court would hear and
determine his illegal search and seizure complaint. Id. at 660-62. Judge Seiler
dissented, arguing that through ineffective assistance of counsel, Caffey lost
his illegal search and seizure defense. Id. at 665-66 (dissenting opinion).
The Henry Court indicated a willingness to bind a defendant by his counsel's
actions or failures in some situations, particularly where counsel makes a deliberate choice of trial strategy that could prove beneficial to the defendant. 379
U.S. at 451. The Court remanded the case to the state court to determine
whether counsel's failure to comply with Mississippi's contemporaneous objection
rule was a deliberate by-pass of state procedures. Apparently the same waiver
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973

29

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 6
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

Thus, the Supreme Court did not adopt an "adequate state ground" rule
for determining the scope of federal habeas corpus relief; no federal district court could accept a concession that "the scope of postconviction
review ... [in habeas corpus] is governed by the rule of Henry v. Mississippi ... ."186 Yet, as stated above, the Caffey court chose to accept Henry's
"procedural default" rule for direct appeals as controlling in collateral
attack (i.e., 27.26) proceedings. Later, in Caffey v. Swenson, 8 7 the federal
district court rejected this "procedural default" approach, held that Caffey
had not deliberately bypassed orderly state procedure, and decided the
88
search and seizure issue on its merits.
Later decisions firmly entrenched Henry's "procedural default" rule
as the controlling standard for courts seeking to avoid deciding search
and seizure issues in 27.26 proceedings, despite the rule's origin as a standard for direct federal review. In the 27.26 appeal in Fields v. State,8 9 defendant Fields again asked the court to consider his search and seizure
claim on the merits. The court relied on its decision in the original Fields

standard applicable to the defendant-knowledgeable and deliberate-is to be
applied to defense counsel, who, although presumed to be knowledgeable, may
not be in the particular case.
The Caffey approach to determining whether a defendant "waived" his constitutional rights would not be acceptable to the federal courts. Frazier v. Roberts,
441 F.2d 1224, 1229 (8th Cir. 1971) (opinion on petition for rehearing). No pre.
sumption of waiver or deliberate by-pass should arise when counsel fails to exercise
those rights. Unless the record convincingly demonstrates a factual background
for a finding of deliberate by-pass, the law requires an evidentiary hearing in
federal court to determine this issue. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965);
United States ex rel. Snyder v. Mazurkiewicz, 413 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1969).
186. State v. Caffey, 457 S.W.2d 657, 660 (Mo. 1970); see note 180 and accompanying text supra.
187. 332 F. Supp. 624 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (habeas corpus petition denied).
188. 332 F. Supp. at 634. No evidentiary hearing was required in federal
court, because, fortunately, a full evidentiary hearing had been held on the issue
in the 27.26 proceedings. The federal district court cited Losieau v. Sigler, 421 F.2d
825 (8th Cir. 1970), for the proposition that a federal court is not bound to find
deliberate by-pass of state remedies simply because the state court did. The
federal district court commented in Caffey, after reviewing federal waiver decisions:
The state may still hold that it is within their procedural interests to bar
a prisoner from raising constitutional issues for the first time in postconviction proceedings. However, whenever a state does so, such a holding
can only be frowned upon because, as was the rule prior to Kaufman, a
federal court must still inquire whether the procedural by-pass was a
knowing and deliberate waiver under federal standards.... On the evidence at the Rule 27.26 hearing, no knowing waiver is shown under applicable federal standards. Petitioner testified without contradiction that
he did not have any familiarity with the law of search and seizure at that
time. Further, his counsel admitted that it did not occur to him to file
a motion to suppress .... Again ... the Missouri Supreme Court applied
a strictly procedural rule in noting the failure of petitioner to object or
assign error on motion for new trial.
332 F. Supp. at 634-35 n.3. (emphasis added).
189. 468 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. 1971).
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The court candidly stated:
We acknowledge the rejection of this position by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on May 24, 1971. Frazier

v. Roberts (Steed), 8 Cir., 441 F.2d 1224 (opinion written on petition for rehearing). We regret the extent to which the problem
presented may endanger "the delicate federal-state relationship in
the criminal law enforcement field." However, we decline to con-

sider appellant's unlawful search and seizure claim under the circumstances of this case. Our holding, of course, "will not preclude
inquiry into appellant's claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding."... 441 F.2d 1224.192
Statements in some Missouri cases that "a claim of illegal search and
seizure is not such a matter as may be raised in a collateral attack upon a
judgment of conviction' 9 3 have obscured the outline of the "procedural
default" rule as it applies to search and seizure issues in 27.26 proceedings.

However, the absolute proscription quoted in the preceding sentence loses
much of its weight upon consideration that, first, most cases in which it
appears involve some definable "procedural default"' 94 under the Missouri

standards,195 and, second, the court has decided search and seizure issues

190. State v. Fields, 442 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1969); see notes 174-75 and accompanying text supra.
191. In addition, the court relied on State v. Caffey, 457 S.W.2d 657 (Mo.
1970), which also relied on Henry. See notes 177-86 and accompanying text supra,
for criticism of reliance on Henry in post-conviction cases.
192. 468 S.W.2d at 32 (emphasis added). In the cited case of Frazier v.
Roberts, 441 F.2d 1224 (8th Cir. 1971) (opinion on petition for rehearing), the
court of appeals held:
The inadvertent failure to raise a constitutional claim at the appropriate juncture ... regardless of its effect as a waiver of later litigation or
review in the State system, will not preclude inquiry into that claim in
a federal habeas corpus proceeding.
Id. at 1230. The Eighth Circuit reversed the federal district court in Frazierfor taking the position that "the Constitution ...does not protect criminal defendants from
mere mistakes of counsel, even though they may be serious ones." Frazier v. Roberts,
310 F. Supp. 504, 511 (E.D. Ark. 1970). Compare this rejected approach with
note 185 supra.
193. E.g., Schleicher v. State, 483 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Mo. En Banc 1972); Smith
v. State, 473 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Mo. 1971); Burnside v. State, 473 S.W.2d 697, 700
(Mo. 1971); Fields v. State, 468 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Mo. 1971); State v. Caffey, 457
S.W.2d 657, 659 (Mo. 1970); see State v. Holland, 412 S.W.2d 184, 185 (Mo.
1967) (decided before amended rule 27.26 became effective).
194. See, e.g., Schleicher v. State, 483 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. En Banc 1972) (no
motion to suppress, objections at trial, or mention of the issue in brief on appeal);
Smith v. State, 473 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. 1971) (no motion to suppress); State v. Caffey,
457 S.W.2d 657 (Mo. 1970) (no motion to suppress, objections at trial, or mention of the issue in brief on appeal); State v. Holland, 412 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. 1967)
(no motion to suppress, no mention of issue in motion for new trial); Brief for
Respondent at 10, Burnside v. State, 473 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1971) (no objections at
trial).

195. See quote in text accompanying note 175 supra.
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on the merits in a number of cases since rule 27.26 was amended and since
cases referring to an absolute proscription have come down.190 This is not
to say that the court will never adhere to an absolute proscription absent
197
ascertainable "procedural default."'
Finally, the court en banc spoke on the question of search and seizure
issues in 27.26 proceedings in Schleicher v. State.19 8 The discussion is not
illuminating. In Schleicher, the defense did not move to suppress, object to
the evidence at trial, or mention the issue in the motion for new trial or
on appeal. The court held that the defendant had therefore "waived" the
right to raise the fourth amendment question under rule 27.26.199 The
court made no effort to determine whether a "deliberate bypass" was involved; 200 the "waiver" was merely a state rule of forfeiture based on prior
"procedural default." 20 ' The Schleicher court went beyond the necessities
196. In White v. State, 430 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. 1968), the first of the search
and seizure cases decided after the effective date of amended rule 27.26, the defendant filed a motion to suppress but then failed to object to the evidence at
trial and failed to raise the issue on appeal. The court said, "Notwithstanding
the circumstances . . . , we shall rule the contention on its merits." Id. at 145.
For other cases involving decisions on the merits of search and seizure issues in
27.26 proceedings since the effective date of amended rule 27.26, see note 171 supra.
197. See Mahurin v. State, 477 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. En Banc 1972). Mahurin is
an unusual case because the defendant moved to suppress, objected to the evidence
at trial, and later raised the search and seizure issue in his motion for a new trial.
Thus, the court had before it a defendant who had done everything he could to enforce the exclusionary rule before trial and at trial in 1949. In holding that the
issue was not reviewable under rule 27.26, the court thought of an original ap.
proach to avoid the issue:
Missouri followed the exclusionary rule on illegally obtained evidence
... before such rule was made obligatory on the states as a matter of
federal constitutional right in Mapp v. Ohio... . Mapp has no retroactive
application.... Therefore, the question here does not involve a federally
protected constitutional right. Inasmuch as the mattr.., is one of state
law, we adhere to the rule laid down in prior cases that the matter is not
one for review on collateral attack under Supreme Court Rule 27.26.
Id. at 35 (citing cases deided before rule 27.26 was amended).
If the defendant in Mahurin had taken a direct appeal on the issue, rule
27.26 (b)(3) probably would have foreclosed any later attempt for 27.26 relief:
"A proceeding under this Rule ordinarily cannot be used . . , as a substitute for
a second appeal." Caffey v. State, 454 S.W.2d 518, 519 (Mo. 1970). But see Ciarelli
v. State, 441 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. 1969) (27.26 proceeding, evidence considered after
direct appeal on issue).
198. 483 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. En Banc 1972).
199. Id. at 394.
200. The trial court found, and the supreme court agreed, that
movant has waived the right to raise ... any question pertaining to his
arrest and "booking" by failure to properly raise and preserve the point
by pre-trial motion, trial objection, motion for new trial, or on original
appeal. .

.

. Unless raised by pretrial motion the same cannot be the

subject of a collateral attack under Rule 27.26, State v. Caffey ....
Id.

201. Id. Relying on the dissent in State v. Caffey, 457 S.W.2d 657, 665-66
(Mo. 1970) (dissenting opinion), counsel in Schleicher argued for the first time
on appeal that trial counsels failure to object to the evidence had deprived the
defendant of effective assistance of counsel. Brief for Appellant at 24-26, Schleicher
v. State, 483 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. En Banc 1972). Thus, under Caffey a finding of
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of the case in quoting from State v. Caffey;202 Caffey referred to an absolute
proscription (albeit gratuitously, as the facts of Caffey dearly showed
20 3
"procedural default"):
In ... Gaffey ... we stated that "a claim of illegal search and
seizure is not such a matter as may be raised in a collateral attack
upon a judgment of conviction." . . ."Not only must defendant
file a motion to suppress the controverted evidence, but he has the
burden of presenting evidence to sustain his contentions." . . . "He
must also keep the question alive by timely objection ....and by
preservation of the issue in a motion for new trial." 204
If the Missouri courts follow this broad dictum 20 5 in future cases, Judge
Seiler's conclusion in dissent that "our divisional decisions have written
Fourth Amendment claims out of rule 27.26"206 will be a correct statement
of the law. Missouri trial courts will not consider illegal search and seizure
complaints at 27.26 evidentiary hearings; 207 further, federal courts examining Missouri law will see dearly that no state post-conviction procedure
is available to vindicate federal fourth amendment claims. 2 0 8 Judge Seiler's
dissent in Schleicher summarizes the problem:
"waiver" might have been avoided. See 457 S.W.2d at 660-61. The Schleicher court
applied another "procedural default" rule in holding that the "contention cannot
be considered because it is mentioned for the first time on this appeal." 483
S.W.2d at 394.
202. 457 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Mo. 1970).
203. See text accompanying note 178 supra.
204. Schleicher v. State, 483 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Mo. En Banc 1972).
205. The Schleicher court first stated that it agreed with the trial court that
"[u~nless raised by pretrialmotion the same cannot be the subject of a collateral
attack under Rule 27.26, State v. Caffey, ... " Id. (emphasis added). This holding of Gaffey and Schleicher should not be confused with the dictum in Schleicher
that the defendant must go beyond the motion to suppress and keep the issue
alive by timely objection and in a motion for new trial. In quoting from Caffey
(see text accompanying note 204 supra), the Schleicher court included a quote
from State v. Fields, 442 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Mo. 1969) (appeal), which the Caffey
court used as the reason for not determining the search and seizure issue on
direct appeal. See 457 S.W.2d at 659.
206. 483 S.W.2d at 395 (dissenting opinion). Judge Seiler continued:
If the defendant does not file a motion to suppress and follow it with appropriate motions and objections, he is held to have waived the point.
If he files the proper motions and objections but loses on appeal, he is
foreclosed because he is then said to be using 27.26 as a second appeal. It
is true many early Missouri decisions took the view the only way to reach
an illegal search and seizure was by motion to suppress and this view has
been carried forward into our application of rule 27.26, even after its revision in 1967, but I do not believe it is tenable in view of Townsend v.
Sain ....and Fay v. Noia....
Id. (emphasis added).
207. The court might make an exception if the legal question involved was
novel at the time of trial. See id. at 394 (trial court finding). Also, the court might
make an exception if the prisoner raised the issue through the motion for a
new trial, but for some reason other than a "deliberate by-pass" failed to appeal.
See Mahurin v. State, 477 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. En Banc 1972); note 197 supra.
208. Federal courts will not require exhaustion of state remedies before considering habeas corpus applications if analysis of state substantive holdings shows
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The basic question is, who is going to hear federal constitutional
search and seizure questions arising from Missouri state convictions? Our divisional position is that it is to be done by the federal
courts .... This leads to conflicts and does not promote finality ....A defendant cannot constitutionally be convicted on evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment... and we
accomplish little by declining to meet the issue, particularly in a
case where there is no evidence of any abuse of process by the defendant. 209
G. Infrequent Complaints
Some complaints appear much less frequently on appeal from 27.26
hearings than do the complaints previously discussed. The following categories of complaints are discussed in descending order of their frequency
in 27.26 appeals.
1. Excessive, Incorrect, and Expired Sentences
Rule 27.26 specifically authorizes attacks on illegal sentences, whether
on constitutional or statutory grounds. Seventeen appeals decided in the
past five years involved complaints about allegedly excessive, incorrect, or
expired sentences. The court granted relief to no prisoner, but the state
obtained relief in two cases in which prisoners had obtained unauthorized
post-conviction relief in the trial court. 210 No subsequent federal cases involved this type of complaint.
The most common sentencing complaint was that the sentence was
excessive under all the circumstances, either because it allegedly constituted
"cruel and unusual punishment" 21 1 or because the court allegedly exceeded its statutory sentencing authority. 212 Some prisoners made very
original but frivolous sentencing arguments to the court.2 18 Although the
that it would be futile for the prisoner to seek state relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b) (1970);
Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HA v. L. Rnv. 1038,
1098-1100 (1970).
209. 483 S.W.2d at 395 (dissenting opinion).
210. Hulett v. State, 468 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1971) (no authority to amend sentence, court lists authorized 27.26 remedies); State v. Todd, 433 S.W.2d 550 (Mo.
1968) (law, not trial court, fixes starting date of sentence).
211. See, e.g., Phillips v. State, 486 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. 1972) (due process and
equal protection arguments combined); Grump v. State, 462 S.W.2d 809 (Mo.
1971) (two 75-year sentences to commence at end of two life sentences); State v.
Grimm, 461 S.W.2d 746 (Mo. 1971) (three consecutive life sentences, within
statutory limits).
212. State v. Weaver, 486 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. 1972) (crediting jail time); Mullin v. State, 473 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. 1971) (trial court authority to make sentences
consecutive); Wynes v. State, 468 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1971) (misdemeanor, escape,
felony conviction within statutory limits).
213. In Tucker v. State, 482 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. 1972), the prisoner asserted
that his unusual sentence of 14 years and 1 day was illegal because it consisted of
2 sentences. Perhaps even more ingenuous was the argument in McBride v. State,
484 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. 1972). The prisoner alleged that he had been "unlawfully
banished" from Missouri as a condition of parole. He then testified that going to
Texas was his idea, formulated in order to avoid parole supervision. Id. at 483.
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courts will consider most sentencing complaints on the merits, the prisoner
must attack the judgment and sentence rather than an action of the Department of Corrections in computing the sentence 21 4 or some other
215
collateral matter.
2. Unconstitutional Identification Procedures
Relying on 3 leading federal cases, 216 17 prisoners also complained
about allegedly unconstitutional identification procedures. The court
granted minor relief in I case.2 17 Two prisoners later unsuccessfully sought
218
federal habeas corpus relief.
Ten of the appeals involved complaints that under the "totality of
the circumstances" the identification of the defendant was "so unnecessarily
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he
was denied due process of law." 219 Few prisoners can expect to obtain postconviction relief even if they did not have counsel during the identification
procedure 220 and the identification was "unnecessarily suggestive." Courts
are adept at finding an "independent source" for any in court identification
of the defendant. 22 1

214. State v. Todd, 433 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. 1968) (starting date of second sentence
changed by record department, inconsistent with judgment recitation).
215. Davis v. State, 460 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. 1970) (sought declaration of order
in which sentences were to be served).
216. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
217. Arnold v. State, 484 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1972) (remanded for hearing on
use of lineup identification evidence).
218. Robertson v. Haynes, 459 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1972); Grant v. Swenson,
313 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
219. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). Most of the earlier Missouri
decisions were based on this decision. E.g., Robertson v. State, 464 S.W.2d 15 (Mo.
1971); State v. Jones, 446 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. 1969); Grant v. State, 446 S.W.2d 620
(Mo. 1959); State v. Reeder, 436 S.W.2d 629 (Mo. 1969); State v. Moore, 435
S.W.2d 8 (Mo. En Eanc 1968).
220.time
Until
few casesprocedure.
have involved
the issue of denial
counsel
v.
Gilbert
rule of of
The constitutional
the identification
of recently,
at the
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)
applies only to cases involving identification confrontations conducted in the
absence of counsel after June 12, 1967. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
Recent cases involving the issue of right to counsel include Arnold v. State,
484 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1972) (remanded for hearing); Fields v. State, 484 S.W.2d
208 (Mo. 1972) (plea waives such nonjurisdictional defect); Tucker v. State, 482
S.W.2d 454 (Mo. 1972) (photographic identification).
221. See, e.g., Robertson v. Haynes, 459 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1972); Davis v.
State, 482 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. 1972); Robertson v. State, 464 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1971);
State v. Jones, 446 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. 1969).
The courts often find other reasons for denying post-conviction relief in this
situation. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 482 S.W.2d 492 (Mo. 1972) (plea of guilty,
confrontation shortly after crime); Schuler v. State, 476 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. 1972)
(plea); Murray v. State, 475 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1972) (Wade not retroactive); Balle
v. State, 467 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. 1971) (issue decided on appeal); Fields v. State,
466 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. 1971) (no prejudice).
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3. Knowing Use of Perjured Testimony
Ten prisoners complained that the prosecution used perjured evidence
in securing their convictions. 222 Although two prisoners obtained minor
relief on this ground,2 23 the court granted no major relief. That is not surprising, considering the almost insurmountable obstacles involved. First,
224
the prisoner must prove that a witness committed perjury at his trial.
Further, he must prove that the prosecution knowingly used the perjured
testimony or knowingly failed to correct testimony that it knew to be
false.22 5 Because these are questions of fact, a hearing must be held if
the prisoner pleads facts in support of the complaint.2 2 6 No prisoner sought
federal habeas corpus relief on this ground.
4. Suppression of Favorable Evidence
Relying upon the leading case of Brady v. Maryland,22 7 10 prisoners

complained that the state suppressed favorable evidence in connection with
their prosecution.2 2. One prisoner who obtained minor relief after alleging
knowing use of perjured testimony also obtained minor relief on this
ground,2 29 but no prisoner obtained major relief. Again, no prisoner subsequenfly sought federal habeas corpus relief.
Most courts appear reluctant to broaden the constitutionally required
scope of criminal discovery by reading the Brady decision expansively.
222. The leading federal case is Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)
(contriving a conviction denies due process). Missouri recognized this ground for
collateral attack in State v. Eaton, 280 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. 1955).

223. Harris v. State, 443 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1969) (evidentiary hearing); State
v. Keeble, 427 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1968) (evidentiary hearing and appointment of
counsel).
224. In State v. Shields, 441 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. 1969), defendant tried to prove
that an officer who testified that defendant admitted participation in a robbery
committed perjury. He and his co-defendant testified that he did not rob anyone; the trial court found that perjury was not proved. Trial court findings against
credibility will seldom be held "clearly erroneous." See Mahurin v. State, 477 S.W.2d
38, 37 (Mo. En Banc 1972).
225. Moore v. State, 453 S.W.2d 958 (Mo. 1970); State v. Shields, 441 S.W.2d
719 (Mo. 1969); State v. Harris, 428 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. 1968).
226. Harris v. State, 448 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1969); State v. Moore, 435 S.W.2d
8 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
227. 373 U.S. 83 (1963), where the Supreme Court ruled that:
[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to
the guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith, or bad faith of the
prosecution.
Id. at 87.
The Brady decision raised a number of questions in the area of criminal discovery that the Court has not answered. See generally Cannon, Prosecutor'sDuty
to Disclose, 52 MMtQ. L. R. v. 516 (1969).
228. E.g., Warren v. State, 482 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. En Banc 1972); Mason v.
State, 468 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1971); Spica v. State, 457 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. 1970)
(citing state and federal cases); Garton v. State, 454 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1970);
McGlathery v. State, 485 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1969).
229. Harris v. State, 443 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1969) (permitted to amend, indude ground in motion for hearing).
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The supreme court has found a variety of reasons for denying applications
23 0
for relief based on this ground.
5. Denial of a Speedy Trial
Nine prisoners complained that they were denied the constitutional28 '

or statutory23 2 right to a speedy trial. The court granted no relief. Two

2 33
prisoners unsuccessfully sought federal habeas corpus relief.
Although dictum in one of these nine cases indicated that a prisoner
cannot raise this issue in a collateral attack,2 34 the dictum was based on an
old federal "procedural default" rule that the sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial must be asserted early or it will be deemed waived.23 5 The
United States Supreme Court rejected this approach in Barker v. Wingo.238

Later Missouri decisions indicate that unless the issue has been decided on

230. Warren v. State, 482 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. 1972) (alleged suppressed docu-

ment not properly identified, not considered); Mahurin v. State, 477 S.W.2d 33
(Mo. 1972) (credibility); Shoemake v. State, 462 S.W.2d (Mo. En Banc 1971)
(no showing transcript not available to lawyer); Malone v. State, 461 S.W.2d 727
(Mo. 1971) (evidence sought irrelevant to defense theory); Patrick v. State, 460
S.W.2d 693 (Mo. 1970) (prosecutor unaware of evidence); Spica v. State, 457
S.W.2d 688 (Mo. 1970) (nothing helpful in wiretap activity sheets); Garton v.
State, 454 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1970) (statement consistent with testimony).
231. U.S. CONsT. amends. IV, VI; Mo. CoNsT. art. I, § 18 (a). Most decisions are
based on federal constitutional precedents.
232. §§ 545.890-.920, RSMo 1969.
233. Keeny v. Swenson, 458 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1972) (16-month delay, defendant partly responsible); Morton v. Haynes, 332 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Mo. 1971)
(trial 10 months after arrest, no prejudice).
234. In State v. Deckard, 459 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. 1970), where 14 months elapsed
between crime and arrest, the court said: "No case cited by appellant and
none which we have found considered the question upon a collateral attack of a
conviction." Id. at 345 (citing federal cases). The trial court had expressed an
opinion at the time of sentencing that the defendant had no right to appeal and
that his remedy was under rule 27.26; therefore, the supreme court said, "[W]e
will not dispose of this case on the grounds of nonavailability of the remedy." Id.
Judge Seiler concurred but did "not agree in the implication there is doubt
whether a claim of denial of speedy trial can be reached under Rule 27.26," because "Rule 27.26 states in so many words that it is for sentences claimed to be
imposed in violation of the state and federal constitutions." Id. at 346 (concurring
opinion).
235. Chapman v. United States, 376 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1967); D'Ercole v. United
States, 361 F.2d 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 995 (1966). The Supreme Court
has called this approach the "demand-waiver doctrine." Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 525 (1972).
236. 407 U.S. 514, 528 (1972). The Court stated its strong opposition to "procedural default" approaches:
Such an approach, by presuming waiver of a fundamental right from inaction, is inconsistent with this Court's pronouncements on waiver of
constitutional rights. The Court has defined waiver as "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Courts should "indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver" ... and they should "not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.
Id. at 525-26.
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appeal 23 7 or waived by a plea of guilty,2 38 it may be considered on its
merits in a 27.26 proceeding.2 89
6. Double Jeopardy
Nine prisoners complained that they were "twice put in jeopardy"
for the same offense. 240 The court granted minor relief in one case.24 1
One prisoner subsequently sought and obtained federal habeas corpus
relief.242 The courts will ordinarily consider the various types of double
2 43
jeopardy claims on the merits.
7. Mental Incompetency to Defend
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits the conviction of a defendant who is incompetent to stand trial; further, it requires that a state provide procedural safeguards sufficient to insure that
this does not happen.2 44 After a federal court granted habeas corpus relief
in Brizendine v. Swenson,245 nine Missouri prisoners sought post-conviction
relief on the ground that because of "reasonable cause to believe that the

accused ha[d] a mental disease or defect excluding fitness to proceed," 240

237. Murray v. State, 475 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1972); Morton v. State, 468 S.W.2d
638 (Mo. 1971); Keeny v. State, 461 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. 1971); Malone v. State,
461 S.W.2d 727 (Mo. 1971) (second term rule).
238. Schuler v. State, 476 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. 1972); Rew v. State, 472 S.W.2d
611 (Mo. 1971) (statutory and constitutional issues waived); Dickson v. State,
449 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. 1970) (frivolous appeal).
239. A reading of the Missouri cases suggests that no rigid "procedural default" rule as mentioned in note 234 supra is imminent.
240. The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment is applicable to the
states via the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
Mo. CoNsT, art. I, § 19 provides: "[N]or shall any person be put again in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense, after being once acquitted by a
jury ... ." (emphasis added). Because of the limited protection under the Missouri
constitution (see, e.g., Murray v. State, 475 S.W.2d 67, 70 (Mo. 1972)), most decisions are based on federal constitutional precedents.
241. Durham v. State, 473 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1971) (hearing on whether justification existed for two mistrials).
242. Spidle v. Swenson, 313 F. Supp. 203 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (new trial on
lower charge after acquittal on higher charge).
243. See, e.g., McCulley v. State, 486 S.W.2d 419 (Mo. 1972) (stiffer sentence
after second plea); Robinson v. State, 482 S.W.2d 492 (Mo. 1972) (two crimes
arising from same facts); Murray v. State, 475 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1972) (jury panel
dismissed, manifest necessity to abort proceedings).
244. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). The state contended that Robinson had intelligently waived the issue of incompetence by failure to request a hearing on the issue at trial and that the trial judge had no duty to order a hearing
sua sponte. The Court rejected the argument because "it is contradictory to
argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently
'waive' his right to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial." Id. at 384.
245. 302 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D. Mo. 1969). The federal court found substantial
doubt about Brizendine's competency; the principles of Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S.
375 (1966) require a competency hearing after such a finding. The Missouri Supreme court had attempted to distinguish Pate in State v. Brizendine, 433 S.W.2d
321 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
246. § 552.020 (2), RSMo 1969.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/6

38

1973]

Anderson: Anderson: Post-Conviction Relief in Missouri
POST CONVICTION RELIEF

the trial court should have held a competency hearing.24 7 The supreme
court granted minor relief in one case,2 48 but no major relief has been
granted in reported state or federal decisions.2 49 Most of these complaints
apparently were "afterthoughts"2 50 by prisoners who had the "capacity to
understand the proceedings ... or to assist in...
defense." 251
8. Miscellaneous Complaints
This section mentions complaints that have arisen infrequently and
that warrant only brief discussion.
Seven prisoners complained on appeal 252 of denial of their right to a
preliminary hearing.2 53 However, no constitutional right to a preliminary
hearing exists. 254 Moreover, a defendant waives the statutory right by entering a plea of guilty25 5 or by going to trial without objecting to denial of
the right.258 One prisoner remained unconvinced that the constitutional
2
ground was frivolous until he reached the federal court of appeals.

7

Although a prisoner dearly may not use a 27.26 proceeding to retry the
issue of guilt,2 58 prisoners sometimes present "newly discovered evidence"

at their post-conviction hearings, hoping thereby to secure a new trial.259
Language in two 27.26 cases 260 indicates that the court might be willing to
247. E.g., Griggs v. State, 479 S.W.2d 478 (Mo. 1972); Donaldson v. State, 477
S.W.2d 84 (Mo. 1972); Jones v. State, 471 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1971) (plea of guilty);
Patrick v. State, 460 S.W.2d 693 (Mo. 1970) (plea of guilty).
248. Carpenter v. State, 449 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. 1970) (hearing on issue).
249. Prisoners subsequently sought federal habeas corpus relief in two cases.
Jones v. Swenson, 339 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Mo. 1972); McCormick v. Swenson, 328
F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
250. McCormick v. State, 463 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. 1971) (mental report, competent to stand trial).
251. § 552.020 (1), RSMo 1969.
252. E.g., Johnson v. State, 485 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1972) (waiver, then motion to
remand for hearing); State v. Ivey, 442 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. 1969) (grand jury indictment, no hearing required).
253. See generally Anderson, The Preliminary Hearing-BetterAlternatives or
More of the Same?, 35 Mo. L. Rxv. 281 (1970).
254. See id. at 283-84 n.8. Section 544.250, RSMo 1969 provides:
No prosecuting or circuit attorney in this state shall file any information
charging any person . . . with any felony, until such person . . . shall
first have been accorded the right of a preliminary examination ....
255. State v. Maloney, 434 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. 1968).
256. State v. Hamel, 420 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. 1967) (after trial started, plea of

guilty).
257. See Collins v. Swenson, 443 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1971) (no constitutional
right to hearing).
258. Beishir v. State, 480 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. 1972) (two men admitted robbery,
thereafter died); Webb v. State, 447 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1969).
259. Mo. Sup. Cr. R. 27.19 (1) authorizes granting a new trial "for newly discovered evidence." A defendant must file any motion for a new trial not later than
40 days after the return of the verdict. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 27.20 (a).
260. Whitaker v. State, 451 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1970); State v. Harris, 428 S.W.2d
497 (Mo. 1968). In Whitaker, the defendant had hearsay evidence that he was not
guilty of robbery. "Assuming, but not holding or implying, that the trial court has
jurisdiction to grant a new trial . . . after more than thirteen years," the court
found the evidence insufficient. 451 S.W.2d at 15. In Harris, the defendant had
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vacate a conviction "in the interest of justice"2 6 1 in an appropriate case

involving newly discovered evidence. Unless the evidence clearly exculpates

the defendant, however, it provides no basis for post-conviction relief. 282
Some prisoners complained unsuccessfully of an "unfair trial" that
denied them due process, relying on the "totality of the circumstances" 2 8
or on particular instances of alleged unfairness. 204 Usually no glaring errors
at trial are involved; the court treats "mere trial errors" as "errors ... to be
corrected by direct appeal." 265r However, "trial errors affecting constitutional rights may be raised even though the error could have been raised
on appeal." 2 66 Ordinarily, in 27.26 proceedings the court will not consider

trial errors that it has already considered, regardless of whether they affect
constitutional rights.2 6 7
moved for a new trial, but after the court overruled the motion he abandoned his
appeal. Although the supreme court at first indicated that it might grant a new
trial if the defendant could show that his conviction rested on perjury, it later said:
By this opinion we do not intend to relax or depart from the rule that in
order to vacate a judgment claimed to have been procured by false testimony under ...

Rule 27.26 it is a requirement that it be alleged and

proved that the State knowingly used false testimony or knowingly failed
to correct testimony which it knew to be false.
428 S.W.2d at 502-03.

261. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONviarToN REMEDIES § 2.1 (a) (v)

(Approved Draft, 1968); note 24 supra.
262. See Whitaker v. State, 451 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1970). In Whitaker, which involved hearsay evidence, the court suggested that the remedy should be executive
pardon under article IV, section 7 of the Missouri Constitution, because the governor "is not restricted by strict rules of evidence." Id. at 15. Richardson v. Swenson, 293 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Mo. 1968), involved "newly discovered evidence" that,
if true, would exculpate the defendant; it tended to show that the deceased died
accidentally rather than at the hands of a felon. The federal district court dismissed the habeas corpus petition without prejudice to give the defendant an
opportunity to present his "newly discovered evidence" to a Missouri court under
rule 27.26. The defendant might logically seek either a pardon or 27.26 relief in
that situation.
263. E.g., O'Neal v. State, 486 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. 1972); State v. Grimm, 461
S.W.2d 746 (Mo. 1971); Sallee v. State, 460 S.W.2d 554 (Mo. 1970). In the Sallee
case the court criticized this approach:
Supreme Court Rule 27.26 plainly provides that a motion to vacate cannot be used as a substitute for direct appeal or for a second appeal to
review trial errors. We view this point as a subterfuge to obtain a review
of a number of trial errors by simply saying that they caused defendant to
be deprived of a fair trial.
Id. at 558-59.
264. E.g., Tucker v. State, 481 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1972) (failure to give instruction); Elbert v. State, 462 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. 1971) (second offender errors); McGlathery v. State, 435 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1969) (prosecutor's remarks).
265. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 27.26 (b) (3). The remedy for "mere trial errors" is direct
appeal "unless the error is so glaring as to make the trial unfair." Tucker v. State,
481 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Mo. 1972).
266. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 27.26 (b) (3).
267. Rule 27.26 (b) (3) provides: "A proceeding under this Rule ordinarily
cannot be used

.

., as a substitute for a second appeal." In Gailes v. State, 454

S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1970), the court stated:
It is our view that where an issue is raised and decided on direct appeal
the defendant cannot obtain another review thereof in a 27.26 proceeding.
And that is true even though he may have a new citation to offer, or a
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/6
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Several prisoners unsuccessfully attacked the constitutionality of
statutes connected with their conviction.26 8 Some complained that they
were denied "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in [defendant's]
favor." 269 One prisoner obtained major relief after alleging obstruction of
his right to appeal; 270 one obtained a hearing; 271 and two others were held
to have waived the right.27 2 Several black prisoners complained of systematic exclusion of black jurors. 273 Some prisoners thought that their
' 2 74
was denied.27 5
right "to be confronted" with the witnesses against [them]
2 76
One prisoner obtained a hearA few complained of denial of allocution.
2 7
ing on his contention that the trial court denied his right to a jury trial, 7
but other prisoners have had difficulty proving denial of such a fundamental right.278 One prisoner complained that the trial court erred in
279
revoking his parole.
somewhat different theory for seeking a favorable decision.... The purpose of [the last clause of rule 27.26 (b) (3)] ... is to provide a review of
constitutional issues where such were not reviewed on appeal. ...
Id. at 563 (citing authority).
In some cases, direct appeal is an inadequate means of reviewing constitutional issues, because the record does not contain the facts essential to a meaningful
review. In those cases, the court should allow full disclosure of the facts in a 27.26
proceeding; the supreme court should review the issue only after the trial court
states findings and condusions. See Williams v. State, 460 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. 1970)
(reviewing denial of effective assistance of counsel issue although considered on
direct appeal). Since State v. Cluck, 451 S.W.2d 103 (Mo. 1970), the court has
declined to review on direct appeal contentions of ineffective assistance of counsel,
because of the need for a 27.26 hearing to develop the facts.
268. Brown v. State, 470 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. 1971) (jury selection statute); Garton v. State, 454 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1970) (jury selection statute); Wilwording v.
State, 438 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1969) (second offender statute).
269. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. This portion of the sixth amendment is applicable

to the states. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). The decisions are Hulstine
v. State, 472 S.W.2d 422 (Mo. 1971); Lansdown v. State, 464 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. 1971);
State v. Cook, 440 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. 1969).
270. State v. Frey, 441 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1969). After the 27.26 hearing, the trial
court erroneously discharged the defendant; it should have vacated for resentencing.
Id. at 15. The time for appeal would start from the date of resentencing.
271. Noble v. State, 477 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. 1972).
272. Burnside v. State, 473 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1971); Newland v. State, 454
S.W.2d 21 (Mo. 1970) (standard of waiver).
273. Brown v. State, 470 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. 1971); Hall v. State, 470 S.W.2d
473 (Mo. 1971); Clark v. State, 465 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. 1971); State v. Selman, 433
S.W.2d 572 (Mo. 1968).
274. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI. The sixth amendment confrontation clause is
applicable to the states. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
275. Covington v. State, 467 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1971); Malone v. State, 461
S.W.2d 727 (Mo. 1971); State v. Ivey, 442 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. 1969).
276. Goodloe v. State, 486 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. 1972) (no right on plea of guilty);
Richardson v. State, 470 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. 1971) (plea of guilty); State v. Friedman,
431 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1968) (trial court granted "allocution" at 27.26 hearing).
277. Burrage v. State, 477 S.W.2d 118 (Mo. 1972) (hearing on question of
waiver, movant entitled to impeach record).
278. Watson v. State, 475 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1972); Young v. State, 473 S.W.2d
390 (Mo. 1971) (knowing and intelligent waiver, burden of proof question).
279. Woody v. State, 445 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Mo. 1969) (substantial basis for
revocation); see ABA STANDAIDs, supra note 124, § 2.1 (b).
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CONCLUSION-AT THE CROSSROADS

The United States Supreme Court has made clear in the so-called
trilogy of Sanders v. United States,280 Fay v. Noia,281 and Townsend V.
Sain 282 that a criminal defendant must receive a full evidentiary hearing
on the merits of every federal constitutional right that he asserts, unless he
has previously waived the right or deliberately by-passed his state pro.
cedural opportunities to assert the right. If the state courts do not conduct
full hearings on the merits of each federal right, the federal courts
often must hold evidentiary hearings years after the original state proceedings that led to conviction. The failure to hold a hearing at the state level
means that there is no state record "adequate for any review that may be
later sought" or to forestall "the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek
to probe murky memories. '283 In such cases, a prisoner might finally ob.
tain federal habeas corpus relief at a time so late that the state could no
longer retry the case and obtain a conviction. Thus, in the absence of
early findings of fact and conclusions of law on the asserted federal right, a
guilty prisoner may go free, not because "the constable blundered," but
because the state courts failed to provide a plenary hearing on the merits
either at some early point in the criminal process, or at the post-conviction
stage.
Faced with the expansion of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction under
the trilogy, the Missouri Supreme Court wisely amended rule 27.26 to
"provide a post-conviction procedure in accord with the principles enunciated in the ... trilogy" that was "designed to discover and adjudicate all
claims for relief in one application." 28 4 By "radically amending" the rule
and encouraging prisoners to assert all claims for relief in one motion, the
supreme court probably intended to maximize Missouri's control over
criminal convictions, maximize the finality of convictions, secure the federal
constitutional rights of defendants in Missouri courts, and thus reduce
the number of federal habeas corpus hearings and the number of instances
in which federal courts would feel compelled to grant habeas corpus in
order to protect federal constitutional rights.28 5 Missouri's leadership in
accepting and promoting the trilogy philosophy that conventional notions
of finality have no place when federal constitutional rights are at stake
286
no doubt pleased the federal courts.
280. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
281. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
282. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
283. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969); see notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text supra.
284. State v. Stidham, 415 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Mo. En Banc 1967); see text accompanying note 1 supra.
285. See Meador, Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal Post.
conviction Review, 50 A.BA.J. 928, 929 (1964).
286. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), where the Court concluded, after
reviewing the history of federal habeas corpus:
[C]onventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be perhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/6
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In 1967, then, it appeared that Missouri had found an ideal way to
reach an accommodation between state criminal procedure and federal
post-conviction review; hopefully, amended rule 27.26 would greatly improve "the delicate federal-state relationship in the criminal law enforcement field." 287 The Missouri courts apparently had assumed complete responsibility for protecting federal constitutional rights in accordance with
federal principles; the federal courts still might review questions of federal
law. The extensive case history since 1967 indictates that, with few exceptions, the federal-state accommodation under amended rule 27.26 works
well. Missouri courts fully consider most federal constitutional questions
on their merits. In most instances, Missouri courts have properly applied
federal law to Missouri findings of fact; over a five-year period, federal
courts have granted habeas corpus relief in only eight cases that the Missouri courts had previously decided.
Some major problems have arisen, however, in connection with the
administration of amended rule 27.26. For a variety of reasons, including
limited criminal discovery and wholesale retention of traditional state notions of "procedural default", 28 8 the state courts frequently do not fully
consider federal constitutional issues on the merits until the post-conviction
stage. This has led to large post-conviction proceeding caseloads, with resulting complaints by judges and lawyers who must struggle to resolve constitutional issues that they believe the courts should have considered earlier
in the criminal process. Appellate judges, concerned with a growing backlog of undecided 27.26 appeals, 28 9 have begun searching for ways to
reduce the trial and appellate caseloads. Limiting the constitutional jurisdiction of the supreme court 290 has begun to spread the appellate case-

load,291 but the supreme court continues to hear and decide a large backlog
of 27.26 appeals initiated prior to January 1,

1972.292

mitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional
rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.
Id. at 424.
287. Frazier v. Roberts, 441 F.2d 1224, 1230 (8th Cir. 1971).
288. See, e.g., cases cited and text accompanying notes 130-31 & 174-75 supra.
Perhaps these rigid rules of "procedural default" are retained in their traditional
form, and on some occasions extended to prevent post-conviction consideration of
federal issues, because of judicial concern that availability of a federal habeas
corpus forum will tend to undermine state procedural requirements. This concern
is basically unjustified. See note 142 supra; Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact
of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1315, 1350-52 (1961). In addition, protecting state rules of procedure through the sacrifice of federal constitutional rights, absent a deliberate by-pass by the defendant, exalts procedure over
substance. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963).
289. See note 8 supra. The table indicates only the rising number of appeals
the court was able to decide.
290. See notes 9-10 and accompanying text supra.
291. No 27.26 decisions of the court of appeals have been reported as of February 1, 1973.

292. The Clerk of the Missouri Supreme Court reported that on January 1,
1973, 111 27.26 appeals with transcripts were still pending. The supreme court
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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In 1970, a resurgence of the supreme court's excessive pre-1967 concern
for the protection of state procedural rules occurred, at the expense of
finality of convictions and state protection of federal constitutional rights.
Before September 1, 1967, the Missouri law had long been that the defendant-victim of an alleged unconstitutional search and seizure had to
move to suppress the resulting evidence and preserve the issue by objection
at trial. Otherwise, he had "waived" his state exclusionary rule remedy.
This meant that he could not raise the issue on appeal or in a post-conviction attack. 293 Mapp v. Ohio2 4 gave the defendant a federal constitutional
exclusionary rule remedy backed up by federal habeas corpus, unless the
defendant had actually waived his fourth amendment rights or deliberately
by-passed his state procedural opportunities to raise the issue. Presumably,
after Mapp, any state court following the principles of the trilogy would
abandon its "procedural default" rule, at least in post-conviction cases, in
order to follow the "deliberate by-pass" test of Fay v. Noia.29u For a time,
the Missouri trial courts and the supreme court did so.290 In 1970, however,
perhaps as a result of an unusual turn of events, 20 7 the supreme court began
to regard the "legitimate state interest" theory of a 1965 United States Supreme Court decision, Henry v. Mississippi,298 as important in determining
the scope of post-conviction review in Missouri; at least Henry contained
language that seemed to support a return to the old state "procedural default" rule in order to dispose of tardy illegal search and seizure complaints
without a hearing.299 Henry, however, was not a federal habeas corpus decision.300 Moreover, the holding in Fay v. Noia specifically rejected reliance on "legitimate state interests" in order to limit the scope of federal
habeas corpus, 3 0 1 except to the extent that the defendant deliberately by-

might need two years to decide those appeals. Telephone conversation with Thomas
F. Simon, Clerk of the Missouri Supreme Court, Feb. 16, 1973.
293. State v. Holland, 412 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. 1967).
294. 867 U.S. 643 (1961).
295. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The court held that the federal judge may in his
discretion deny relief to a state prisoner who has forfeited his state court remedies
by deliberately by-passing the orderly procedure of the state courts. Id. at 438.
Thus, the Court attempted to accommodate both the interests of the state in pro.
tecting the integrity of its procedural rules and the countervailing interest in pro.
tecting a state prisoner's federal constitutional rights.
296. E.g., White v. State, 430 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. 1968); see cases cited note 171
supra.
297. See notes 179-80 and accompanying text supra.
298. 579 U.S. 443 (1965); see notes 183-84 and accompanying text supra.
299. 379 U.S. at 447-48.
500. See note 183 supra.
301. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), where the Court concluded:
[We reject as unsound in principle, as well as not supported by authority, the suggestion that the federal courts are without power to grant
habeas relief to an applicant whose federal claims would not be heard on
direct review in this Court because of a procedural default furnishing an
adequate and independent ground of state decision.
Id. at 434.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/6
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passed a reasonable state procedural remedy. Even the 1965 Henry decision
30 2
noted this continuing principle of Fay v. Noia.
Because no basis exists in federal cases for the supreme court's deviation from the principles of the trilogy in "procedural default" cases; the
court should reconsider, at the earliest opportunity, its recent decisions
303
It
concerning illegal search and seizure issues in 27.26 proceedings.
should also reconsider the "procedural default" rule recently extended to

27.26 cases; that rule often precludes consideration of allegations that
officers obtained confessions or statements in an unconstitutional manner.30 4 No "procedural default" cases, sometimes mistakenly called "waiver"
cases,3 05 decided prior to September 1, 1967, should be resurrected or extended to post-conviction cases as authority for refusing to decide constitutional issues on the merits. The court should apply the "deliberate bypass" standard of the trilogy as the only rule of "procedural default" in
post-conviction cases. If the Missouri Supreme Court follows these suggestions, it will bring the scope of post-conviction relief in Missouri into line
with the scope of relief available in federal habeas corpus under the
principles of the trilogy. The federal courts will be pleased that Missouri
has again achieved the most desirable accommodation between state
criminal procedure and federal post-conviction review. 3 00 Missouri judges
and lawyers will be pleased because they will no longer have to become
familiar with two lines of post-conviction authority, state and federal, on
some issues. Further, Missouri lawyers who now face the possible necessity
of both state and federal post-conviction evidentiary hearings in order to
302. Henry v. Mississippi, 879 U.S. 443, 452 (1965); text accompanying note
185 supra.
303. See Schleicher v. State, 483 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Mo. En Banc 1972) (dissenting opinion); see text accompanying note 209 supra.
304. Evans v. State, 465 S.W.2d 500 (Mo. 1971); see notes 140-41 and accompanying text supra.
305. E.g., Schleicher v. State, 483 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Mo. En Banc 1972) (movant
"waived" the right to raise fourth amendment question); see notes 120-21 supra,
distinguishing "procedural default" from "waiver."
306. In 1971 the Missouri Supreme Court and the Judicial Council of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Judicial Circuit established the
State-Federal Judicial Council for Missouri. The membership consists of seven
state judges, including two judges of the supreme court and one judge of the court
of appeals, and five federal judges, including two judges of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals. The supreme court approved the following statement of objectives:
The general objectives to be effectuated and furthered by the establishment of the Council are to promote and harmonize a better relationship
between the state and federal courts, to eliminate or minimize any conflicts
which may have developed or could result from the operation of the dual
federal and state judicial systems, and generally to improve and expedite
the administration of justice by state and federal courts in Missouri.
Per Curiam Order In the Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc, Feb. 5, 1971 (emphasis added).
Perhaps this Council should actively seek to eliminate conflicts like those produced by decisions like Schleicher v. State, 483 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. En Banc 1972).
It should at least provide a forum for discussion of the problems.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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fully protect the constitutional rights of their clients will be pleased that
they can combine "all claims for relief in one application" (i.e., a Missouri
27.26 motion).
If the judges and lawyers of Missouri think that administrative problems under amended rule 27.26, including the heavy trial and appellate
caseloads, indicate a need for reform, that reform should also be consistent with the principles of the trilogy. Amending rule 27.26, either
gradually by case law or swiftly by changing its provisions to eliminate certain federal constitutional grounds for relief, would do little to reduce the
caseload. Moreover, this would certainly damage "the delicate federalstate relationship." Missouri courts should be masters of their own criminal
proceedings; they should maximize the finality of Missouri convictions.
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